Is there too much certainty when measuring uncertainty by da Silva Filho, Tito Nícias Teixeira
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Is there too much certainty when
measuring uncertainty
Tito N´ıcias Teixeira da Silva Filho
Universtity of Oxford, Central Bank of Brazil
2005
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16383/
MPRA Paper No. 16383, posted 22. July 2009 05:43 UTC
 1
Is There Too Much Certainty When Measuring 
Uncertainty? A Critique of Econometric Inflation 
Uncertainty Measures with an Application to Brazil* 
 
 
 
TITO NÍCIAS TEIXEIRA DA SILVA FILHO† 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper criticises the econometric inflation uncertainty proxies found 
in the literature, which show an overly optimistic picture about our real 
ability to forecast, and highlights the sharp contrast between the evidence 
portrayed by that literature and the evidence conveyed by the literature 
on surveys of inflation expectations. While the latter shows that actual 
forecasts are usually biased and systematic forecast errors are pervasive 
the former shows a much more optimistic picture, in accordance with the 
rational expectations paradigm. Also, both literatures have historically 
shown conflicting evidence on the inflation level – inflation uncertainty 
link. Next, the performance of inflation forecasts from both the Central 
Bank of Brazil Inflation Report and the Focus Survey are analysed. The 
paper then pinpoints some simple measures that could be taken to 
improve the reliability of econometric inflation uncertainty proxies, and 
carries out a (pseudo) real-time forecasting simulation exercise to derive 
a set of such proxies for Brazil. The features of those forecasts are shown 
to be very similar to those found in surveys. 
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“The main challenges facing the theory of economic 
forecasting, however, are to explain the recurrent 
episodes of mis-forecasting observed historically, and 
to develop methods which avoid repeating such 
mistakes in future.” 
 
David F. Hendry (2003) 
 
1 – Introduction 
 
 
Alan Greenspan (1996) stated “Price stability obtains when economic agents no longer take 
account of the prospective change in the general price level in their economic decision 
making”. Blinder (1995) definition is similar: “The definition I’ve long used for price stability 
is a situation where ordinary people in their ordinary course of business are not thinking and 
worrying about inflation”. Those definitions implicitly reveal two dimensions of price 
stability. The first could be called the “referee dimension”, and is linked to the inflation level. 
This term is an allusion to an old football saying, which states that a good referee is the one 
whose presence in the pitch is barely noticed during the match. In the same way, price 
stability requires an inflation rate that is so low that people do not feel bothered about its 
existence. The second is the “time dimension”, and is related to uncertainty. Even if inflation 
is low today there is no guarantee that it will be low tomorrow. In other words, price stability 
requires both low inflation and low inflation uncertainty, otherwise future inflation will still 
be a concern when economic agents make their medium and long-term plans. 
 
Notwithstanding their qualities, neither definition gives a precise value for the inflation rate 
compatible with price stability. Meltzer (1997) was a little bit more specific and defined price 
stability as “… an inflation rate so close to zero that it ceases to be a significant factor in long-
term planning”. However, even inflation rates close to zero can make much difference over 
long periods. Suppose that a consumer buys a 25-year zero-coupon nominal bond for his 
retirement. If he assumes that the current inflation rate of, say, 1.5%, will prevail in the future, 
but average inflation turns out to be 2.5% instead, which still is a very low rate of inflation, he 
will incur a 40% unexpected loss. Unless one has some crystal ball revealing the future path 
of prices, the existence of inflation uncertainty has important implications for both economic 
theory and policy. Indeed, the literature about the costs and benefits of inflation points out 
that inflation uncertainty is a major cost of inflation. Not surprisingly, a central part of 
Friedman’s (1977) Nobel Lecture dealt with the real effects of inflation uncertainty, which he 
claimed affects adversely unemployment, output and productivity. 
 
There is overwhelming evidence that inflation uncertainty is positively related to the inflation 
level. If such a link exists, it has a direct policy implication, namely: the central bank should 
keep inflation low so as to keep inflation uncertainty also low. Similarly, one could argue that 
inflation-targeting countries should aim at setting inflation targets with narrow bands to 
minimise inflation uncertainty (as long as those bands are credible!). Furthermore, inflation 
uncertainty underscores the importance of knowing how expectations are formed. If agents’ 
expectations are usually unbiased and efficient, as implied by the rational expectations 
hypothesis, then inflation uncertainty would have minor welfare costs and, consequently, it 
should not be a major concern for economic policy. However, if forecasts go often astray as 
Hendry’s quote above suggests, then it has important theoretical implications that should be 
considered. Moreover, in this case one could call into question the usefulness of surveys of 
expectations for policy makers. If, when setting monetary policy, the central bank puts too 
much weight on market inflation forecasts, which are often not very accurate, it can produce 
undesirable effects on inflation control and, therefore, output volatility. 
 
In order to address rigorously these and other questions, as well as test Friedman’s 
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hypothesis, it is essential that inflation uncertainty be measured as reliably as possible. By 
reliability one should understand measures aimed at reflecting actual uncertainty, and not 
measures that are in conformity with some paradigm, such as rationality. However, instead of 
being treated as a hypothesis that should be tested, rational expectations are usually taken as 
an axiom by economists. As a consequence, uncertainty has historically had a limited role in 
mainstream macroeconomics (e.g. certainty equivalence results). The intrinsic optimism 
conveyed by rational expectations has not been innocuous, though, and often economists’ 
ability to understand real phenomena is hampered as unreasonable assumptions are imposed 
when testing hypothesis. 
 
For example, inflation uncertainty studies usually encompass the 1970s and as it is widely 
known inflation rose both sharply and unexpectedly during the 1970s. The two oil shocks that 
hit the world economy at that time were unprecedented events, and no one knew how serious 
and persistent their effects would be, as well as the reaction of central banks. As a result 
inflation was highly unpredictable during the 1970s. Unequivocal evidence on this regard can 
be found in inflation surveys. For instance, commenting on inflation forecasts during the 
1970s Croushore (1998) noticed that: “In the early 1980, economists tested inflation forecasts 
and found that forecasts were very bad. [..] However, the sample period being examined 
consisted mostly of data from the volatile 1970s, when forecasting was extremely difficult”. 
David Dodge (2003), the current Bank of Canada Governor, has recently stated “Although 
inflation is now low, stable and predictable, this has not always been the case. Indeed, in the 
1970s, inflation was high, unstable, and unpredictable. This led to the establishment of the 
Anti-Inflation Board (AIB) in 1975, where I worked as Research Director.” In its turn, Ball 
(1990) highlighted the associated policy uncertainty at the end of the 1970s noting that “In the 
late 70s, it would have been difficult to predict that sharp disinflation would arrive in 1981–
1982.” Several historical examples show unequivocally that the rise in inflation during the 
1970s was not anticipated and that the inflationary surprise was very costly to the economy. 
The failure of the so-called big macro models in the U.S., which began to perform badly in 
the 1970s, is another piece of evidence on the difficulties in forecasting at that time. Indeed, 
from a forecasting viewpoint Hendry (2000a) acknowledges that “…periods of forecast 
failure and economic turbulence often go hand in glove…”  
 
However, when testing the link between the inflation level and inflation uncertainty, Engle 
(1983) made a truly remarkable statement. He stated that: “Although the level of inflation in 
the seventies was high, it was predictable”. So, what explains Engle’s assessment, which goes 
against a huge amount of evidence on the contrary, and whose paper has become an 
obligatory reference in the inflation uncertainty literature? A major problem with Engle’s 
study, as well as with works that derive inflation uncertainty proxies econometrically, is 
temporal inconsistency. By estimating inflation uncertainty using the whole sample, instead 
of only data available at the time of the forecast, Engle threw out a huge part of the 
uncertainty forecasters faced.1 The use of historically unavailable data is the most visible part 
of such inconsistency, but it is only part of the problem, since the 1970s inflation was 
obviously much better understood later on, and Engle benefited hugely from that hindsight. 
For example, he included import prices in his model, which accounted for higher oil prices. 
Interestingly, Stock and Watson (1999) argue that out-of-sample Phillips curve forecasts that 
include supply shocks variables, such as the relative price of energy, perform badly when 
compared to the corresponding models that exclude them, since the coefficients of those 
variables are poorly estimated for much of the sample. However, this situation changes when 
the whole sample (1959–1997) is used instead. Hence, including energy prices in whole 
sample estimation is likely to underestimate actual forecast errors, even if agents used them to 
forecast inflation at that time. 
                                                 
1 A different but related problem is pinpointed by Orphanides (2000). He criticises many papers that 
analysed the optimality of the U.S. monetary policy showing that their conclusions were flawed since 
they used revised and definitive data. 
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Another major problem with Engle’s approach is that in-sample forecasts are built to produce 
zero mean one-step ahead forecasts errors, in compliance with the rational expectation 
paradigm, and regardless of model’s adequacy. However, if actual forecast errors are biased, 
any inference from a setting that did not allow for this possibility could be compromised. 
More importantly, if the econometric model is well specified, in-sample forecast errors should 
be uncorrelated, ruling out the possibility of long runs of positive and negative errors, a 
feature that has been widely observed in practice. Therefore, once the strong assumptions 
underlying in-sample “forecasts” are made clear, Engle’s comments seem almost 
unavoidable. Greenspan (1999), for example, called to attention that “Forecasts of inflation 
and of growth in real activity for the United States, including those of the Federal Open 
Market Committee, have been generally off for several years. Inflation has been chronically 
overpredicted and real GDP growth underpredicted.” Pagan (2001) also points out that 
“Problems in predicting inflation have been a worldwide problem in the mid to late 1990s and 
it seems that quite new perspectives may be required in order to produce good predictions of 
it from a model.” Greenspan and Pagan’s remarks are clearly illustrated by surveys of 
expectations and show that problems in forecasting inflation were not restricted to the 
turbulent 1970s as one might think, but are a more pervasive phenomenon.  
 
Temporal inconsistency is also pivotal in some forecasting methods. For example, regime-
switching models assume that agents know in advance how many different states there are in 
the world and are able to assess the probabilities attached to each of them, so that current 
inflation forecasts depend on information about future unknown regimes. Modern 
econometric techniques also call to attention another uncomfortable feature of recent 
econometric inflation uncertainty measures, which could be called theoretical inconsistency. 
In the same way that is crucial to restrict the information set to only historical available data 
when assessing forecast uncertainty, it is desirable to forecast inflation using methods similar 
to those that were actually available to most forecasters, if one wants to proxy the 
expectations prevailing at that time. Theory inconsistency can be split into two dimensions. 
The first refers to the forecast technique itself. For instance, it is unrealistic to assume that a 
forecaster (especially a professional econometrician!) would have predicted inflation before 
mid-1980s using an ARCH model, or before mid-1990s using an asymmetrical GARCH or 
Markov switching model, simply because those techniques were either not yet invented or not 
often used. Of course, one could always argue that those models are only intended to obtain 
proxies of inflation uncertainty and should not be interpreted literally. Although this argument 
seems correct, its implementation is problematic, since evidence shows that even qualitative 
results are highly dependent on the particular specification and method used, as one would 
expect (see Golob, 1993 and Holland, 1993). Moreover, economists do usually interpret the 
evidence literally and make strong inferences from it. Finally, since one is aiming at assessing 
the degree of uncertainty agents in general face, it would remain a puzzle how ordinary 
economic agents were able to produce forecasts with the same properties as those derived 
from highly trained, experienced, full time PhD economists using advanced techniques. 
  
Secondly, many techniques were only possible to be implemented – and later on to became 
widespread used – due to advances in computing technology. Therefore, it does not seem 
rational (in the common sense of the word) to assume that forecasters outside universities – 
where technology lags behind – would have used techniques that would have required big 
processing power or very specific programs before the end of the 1980s and, sometimes, even 
well into the 1990s. Besides, even when technology is available there is a substantial time lag 
between inventions and its effective use by others, as the productivity literature shows. Even 
today, when econometric packages are user-friendly and widely available, informal evidence 
shows that many forecasters outside universities make predictions based on simple rules of 
thumb, extrapolations or other simple methods (see, for example, Coyle, 2000).  
 
Finally, another important limitation of Engle’s work is the focus on short-run measures of 
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uncertainty, typically one-quarter ahead. This is unexpected since the literature about the 
costs of inflation makes it clear that the most relevant horizon for inflation uncertainty refers 
to the medium and long runs. For example, the inflation risk premium is usually an important 
component in longer-term bonds but not in shorter maturities ones. As a matter of fact, it must 
be said that one-quarter ahead inflation uncertainty has little relevance in most actual 
economic decisions (e.g. consumption).2 This is particularly true in monetary policy decisions 
due to the lags involved in the transmission mechanism. Therefore, even when reliable, short-
run uncertainty measures could be uninformative. Hence, one can characterize the 
econometric inflation uncertainty literature as focusing too much on estimation techniques 
and too little on the economic problem being analysed. Why is this so? 
 
One explanation is simply to recognise that traditional one-step ahead in-sample forecasts are 
much easier to obtain than multi-step forecasts, since they come as a “bonus” with the 
estimation process. Although this reason seems dismal, very often economists’ choices are 
much more based on, say, models’ analytical tractability features (e.g. quadratic loss function) 
or simplicity (e.g. the use of HP filter to calculate the output gap) than on rigorous thinking or 
realism, and often strong conclusions and policy implications are derived from these flawed 
frameworks. Another hypothesis is that in-sample forecasts come already packed with 
rational expectations features (e.g. unbiased), which is not guaranteed in out-of-sample 
forecasts. 
 
This paper takes temporal inconsistency seriously, and claims that economists have been too 
optimistic when assessing the degree of uncertainty forecasters actually face. By disregarding 
key limitations forecasters face in practice, econometric uncertainty proxies found in the 
literature are bound to underestimate actual inflation uncertainty being misleading. In order to 
establish and assess the degree of inflation uncertainty likely to be found in practice the 
international experience portrayed by surveys of expectations will be analysed, as well as 
some well-known cases of forecast failure. Finally, the historical inflationary experience of 
Brazil will be used to develop further the issue. Brazil is a very good choice to study inflation 
uncertainty since it can be characterized as a country with endemic inflation uncertainty. 
 
Section 2 explains and provides evidence on why inflation uncertainty matters. Section 3 
shows the pervasiveness of forecast failure in practice, a fact that is in sharp contrast with 
what one learns in macroeconomic textbooks. It also calls to attention that unbiasedness is a 
very poor criterion in judging rationality. Section 4 presents a selective review of the inflation 
uncertainty literature and highlights the conflicting evidence from econometric studies and 
surveys of expectations. Section 5 shows a dismal picture of forecast failure in Brazil in 
recent years, and provides some evidence on the significant costs caused by inflation 
uncertainty. Section 6 derives inflation uncertainties proxies for Brazil taking into account the 
issues of temporal and theory inconsistency, and shows how relevant both the information set 
and the forecast horizon are in assessing uncertainty. It also provides evidence on the inflation 
uncertainty-level link for Brazil. The following section concludes the paper. 
 
 
2 – Why Does Inflation Uncertainty Matter? 
 
 
Inflation uncertainty matters because the future is largely unpredictable and inflation is a key 
variable in economic agents’ decisions. Expected inflation is a key variable to consumers, for 
example, when deciding which mortgage plan to choose (i.e. fixed-rate or variable-rate) and 
how much to borrow, or yet how much to save for retirement. It is a crucial variable in firms’ 
                                                 
2 Notice, however, that when inflation is high the long-run is much shorter. In such a case one-quarter 
ahead inflation uncertainty is much more relevant than in a low inflation economy. 
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investment decisions since, for instance, it is closely linked to expected real interest rates. 
Since the tax system is imperfectly indexed, inflation uncertainty also creates uncertainty 
about future depreciation allowances and real tax rates. Investors care about expected 
inflation when buying bonds and the Government when making budget and long term plans. 
 
Inflation uncertainty was a major factor behind the disappearance of the 25-year fixed-rate 
mortgages market in Canada as inflation increased, a phenomenon that was reversed in the 
1990s as inflation decreased (see Coletti and O’Reilly, 1998). Another striking example of its 
costs is the crippled Brazilian credit market, in which medium and long-term fixed-rate 
financing virtually never existed. Similarly, the maturities of nominal public bonds have 
rarely been above two years in Brazil. Thus, incomplete credit markets are an unequivocal 
example of inflation uncertainty costs. 
 
Yet, until recently, uncertainty played a limited role in some important economic subjects. 
Many models exhibited certainty equivalence results, where future inflation was simply and 
harmlessly replaced by its rational expectation forecast, which are assumed to be unbiased.3 
However, this is sharply at odds with the empirical evidence, which shows unambiguously 
that predicting inflation just one year ahead is a real challenge to forecasters. Gavin and 
Mandal (2003) show, for example, that the range of inflation forecasts made by FOMC 
members increases sharply when the forecast horizon is greater than one year.  
 
Fortunately, since the 1990s uncertainty has become more than just a nuisance, with the 
arrival of the real options approach to investment, which unveiled the powerful effects of 
uncertainty when decisions are irreversible and possible to be postponed. Note, however, that 
even easy reversible decisions, such as buying a fixed-rate bond, can be highly affected by 
long-run inflation uncertainty. The major reason is that structural breaks are detectable only 
after some time. When it becomes clear that the actual inflation path is not in accordance with 
what had been anticipated (i.e. forecasts have gone systematically awry) the harm would 
already be done. 
 
2.1 – Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Costs of Inflation Uncertainty 
 
In spite of “uncertainty neutrality” results being commonly found in mainstream macro 
models, the literature about the costs of inflation has, for a long time, recognized inflation 
uncertainty as a major cost of inflation (e.g. Fischer and Modigliani, 1978).4 More broadly, 
this literature distinguishes between the costs of anticipated and unanticipated inflation (i.e. 
inflation uncertainty).5 The most intuitive reason why inflation uncertainty is costly is because 
things may not happen as expected, and the associated forecast error implies a loss. Those 
losses are defined as the ex-post costs of inflation uncertainty, which also entails defensive 
actions by economic agents, who seek to mitigate those costs. Those actions are defined as the 
ex-ante costs of inflation uncertainty, since if there were no uncertainty no action would be 
needed. Although both costs are linked, they are conceptually different. At first, one might 
think that ex-post costs, which are directly linked to the concept of forecast errors, are more 
relevant than ex-ante costs, but this is not necessarily true. For example, by affecting 
decisions – both qualitatively and quantitatively – and by diverting resources, inflation 
uncertainty reduces economic efficiency and, therefore, affects productivity. Thus, both types 
of costs are potentially serious. 
 
                                                 
3 The well known Lucas (1973) limited information model is actually a model of inflation uncertainty, 
where uncertainty affects real output only in the short-run, since forecast errors are assumed to be zero 
on average. However, Lucas’ model is highly stylised. For example, it does not consider the effects of 
inflation uncertainty on credit markets and investment, which are likely to produce long-term effects.  
4 For a survey on theories about inflation uncertainty see da Silva Filho (2006). 
5 See, for example, Fischer and Modigliani (1978), Golob (1994) and Briault (1995). 
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Probably the most visible ex-ante cost of inflation uncertainty is the decrease on the average 
maturity of nominal financial contracts. This happens because whenever inflation is, say, 
higher than expected, creditors engaged in nominal contracts incur a loss and, consequently, 
debtors obtain a gain. In other words, there is an unanticipated wealth transfer from creditors 
to debtors. Therefore, under high inflation uncertainty economic agents prefer contracts with 
shorter maturities in order to protect themselves against unforeseen events. This phenomenon 
has been widely recognized and documented.6 Besides moving to shorter maturity contracts 
agents also move from nominal to indexed contracts, especially in longer-term transactions. 
Consequently, agents require a risk premium when entering nominal contracts under inflation 
uncertainty, and this premium increases both with the degree of inflation uncertainty and the 
maturity of those contracts. 
 
As a result, the real interest rate is likely to be higher in a high inflation uncertainty 
economy.7 In its turn, higher real interest rates depress consumption, investment and are an 
extra burden to the Government, which has to pay more interest on its debt. Hence, the 
inflation risk premium embedded in nominal interest rates is another important ex-ante cost of 
inflation uncertainty. Not surprisingly, the relatively higher long-term interest rates in the 
U.S. during the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s are usually attributed to the increase in 
the inflation risk after the 1970s high inflation period (Golob, 1994). Moreover, as mentioned 
above, when inflation uncertainty is high enough it may lead to the disappearance of some 
markets, which could be interpreted as agents requiring an infinite risk premium, ultimately 
causing the collapse of the market. Therefore, incomplete markets are an extreme cost of 
inflation uncertainty. 
 
More broadly, by shortening planning horizons inflation uncertainty has important allocative 
effects. For example, higher real interest rates depress investment, especially longer-term 
investment, increasing the relative incentive to undertake shorter-term investment. If both 
types of investment are complementary, there will be an efficiency loss. Since the economy is 
not fully indexed inflation uncertainty also means uncertainty about future corporate tax rates 
and uncertainty about future depreciation rates. Both factors imply uncertainty about future 
corporate profits, which is likely to depress investment. Inflation uncertainty also means 
uncertainty about other economic variables, such as GDP, exchange rates and demand. 
 
The ex-post costs of inflation uncertainty can also be very high. Indeed, the effects of 
forecasts errors go well beyond simply wealth transfers between individuals. They can be 
very costly to firms, sectors and even to the whole economy. Two crucial examples are: a) the 
crisis in the savings and loans industry in the 1980s, which impinged a large cost to the U.S. 
economy. Although one can argue that the crisis could have been averted or lessened by 
better banking regulation, as Golob (1994) points out “If the inflation of the 1970s had been 
less of a surprise, the taxpayer bailout of the industry might have been avoided”; b) the 1980s 
developing countries debt crisis can also be linked to inflation uncertainty. Indeed, it is argued 
that the over-borrowing by those countries during the 1970s was due to inflation uncertainty 
(see Selody, 1990). It seems unequivocal that had those countries anticipated, at least in some 
extent, the increase in inflation and therefore in interest rates, they would have adopted a 
different strategy: either by borrowing less or choosing fixed-rates loans, and the costs to their 
economies of changes in the U.S. monetary policy would have been much lower.  
 
Finally, inflation uncertainty is particularly costly because it is closely linked to policy 
credibility. Since credibility requires a long time to build but can be suddenly lost, inflation 
uncertainty is likely to suffer from hysteresis. Once economic agents are stung by the costs of 
                                                 
6 For example, see Klein (1975) for the effects of inflation uncertainty in the U.S. economy, and Coletti 
and O’Reilly (1998) and Stuber (2001) for the Canadian economy. 
7 The ex-ante real interest rate will certainly be higher, however, if large enough forecast errors are 
committed then the ex-post real interest rate may actually turn out to be lower during some periods. 
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higher unexpected inflation, as happened during the 1970s and 1980s, the inflation risk 
premium is likely to increase and remain high for some time after inflation decreases. Indeed, 
Gagnon (1997) argues that the higher inflationary past in Canada and New Zealand vis-à-vis 
the U.S. and Australia respectively, explains the higher long-term real interest rates observed 
in the former countries relatively to the latter, despite the fact that at the time of the analysis 
they had smaller inflation rates than their neighbours in the previous five years. This finding 
implies that by keeping inflation low for a long enough period the central bank could reduce 
sharply inflation uncertainty and, therefore, the inflation risk premium. 
 
2.2 – Indexation and Inflation Uncertainty 
 
When analysing the costs of anticipated inflation Fischer (1981) argued that some of its costs 
are “almost entirely avoidable”, especially those stemming from the perverse interaction 
between inflation and the tax system. Although he focused on the costs of anticipated 
inflation, it is obvious, as argued above, that indexation also lessens sharply the costs of 
unanticipated inflation. Given this assessment, economists have been struck by the fact that 
indexation is not nearly as widespread as it should be, a puzzle that has been highlighted by 
Shiller (1997). The evidence shows that only when inflation reaches fairly high levels does 
“the public resistance to indexation” fade away more consistently. 
 
Fischer and Summers (1989) note that “The absence of indexation is not an accident. Policies 
directed at mitigating the effects of inflation are often seriously put forward. For example, the 
original Reagan Administration proposal for tax reform called for the use of indexing in 
measuring capital income; and a transition advisory team for that administration 
recommended the issue of indexed bonds. Both proposals were quickly discarded”. Indeed, 
only in 1997 were inflation-indexed bonds finally introduced in the U.S. However, even 
though indexation sharply reduces tax-related distortions caused by inflation, its efficacy in 
mitigating the costs of inflation uncertainty is not as obvious and large as many economists 
seem to assume. Notwithstanding Shiller’s argument that there seems to be some non-rational 
factors behind such puzzle, Stockman (1993) notes that “Perhaps economists have overstated 
the gains from indexing – if they were so large, we would see more indexing in private 
contracts”.  
  
In fact, Schultze (1997) argues that Shiller’s conclusions are based on the demand-side 
evidence for indexation, but not on the supply side, from where, he claims, most of the 
resistance to indexation comes from. In that case, he argues, the resistance to indexation is 
partially justified, making the evidence less puzzling. He gives the following example, 
reproduced partially here: “Take the case of indexing a private bond issue. There are three 
reasons why indexation might increase the risks faced by a firm. First, some inflation 
surprises originate from supply shocks. In such cases, the increase in average product prices 
that gives rise to an additional nominal obligation under indexation will not be matched by an 
equivalent increase in a firm’s ability to pay. Second, monetary shocks work their way 
through the economy by complex processes, which, in the transition period, may involve 
substantial changes in the relative prices and fortunes of individual firms”. Indeed, whenever 
incomes and revenues received by households and firms respectively are not perfectly 
correlated to expenditures made by the former and costs faced by the latter, indexation could 
involve important risks, and does not provide full insulation from inflation (and other types 
of) uncertainty. Hence, due to risk aversion, many consumers prefer to pay a high-risk 
premium in nominal contracts to avoid such kind of unpleasant surprise. Therefore, even 
under indexation, consumption and investment decisions are likely to be affected by inflation 
uncertainty. Likewise, investment decisions become more difficult under inflation 
uncertainty, as nominal and real returns are harder to assess.  
 
Even in those cases when indexation is desirable it might not fully insulate economic agents 
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from inflation uncertainty. In other words, indexation is usually imperfect. One reason is that 
it typically lags behind inflation. As Friedman (1977) notices “Price indexes are imperfect; 
they are available only with a lag and generally are applied to contract terms only with a 
further lag.” A related but different problem is that indexation might occur with “the wrong 
frequency”. For example, even during high inflation in Brazil rent prices were not as 
frequently corrected as many other prices in the economy. That sometimes meant huge 
differences between the real value of the first and the last rent payments within the same 
contract, causing many distortions. Schultze (1997) cites evidence on “the substantial 
difficulties faced by private firms in providing protection in pension formulas during the 
working life of an individual…” Indexation can also be imperfect due to other reasons. For 
example, if housing loan instalments are not allowed to exceed a certain proportion of an 
individual’s income, and the real interest rate rise sharply or his income does not keep in pace 
with inflation, then an outstanding residual, which can be substantial, will remain to be paid at 
the end of the contract. Problems similar to this were frequent in Brazil and caused a huge 
deficit in the public housing finance scheme. 
 
Due to the above asymmetries, under some circumstances, agents might feel more 
comfortable with nominal contracts, since they know in advance how much they will pay or 
receive in the future.8 Thus, nominal contracts are not dominated by indexed contracts in all 
states of the world. Indeed, interestingly, notice that even in countries where indexation is 
widespread and easily understood by agents, such as in Brazil, the evidence shows that 
whenever inflation fell following stabilisation plans, the share of nominal public bonds 
increased (see Graph 6 in Section 5), indicating that indexed and nominal bonds are not 
perfect substitutes. 
 
Although most indexation supply seems to come from the public sector, there are many 
reasons why the Government may not desire to or should not index the economy. For 
example, Fischer and Summers (1989) argue that decreasing the cost of inflation through 
indexation could be dangerous and end up causing more inflation. Indeed, in countries with 
high inflation history such as Brazil indexation is seen as a bitter remedy (even though it 
contributed decisively to avoiding dollarisation), since while it lessens the costs of inflation it 
also increases its persistence, making stabilisation more difficult. Coping with inflation inertia 
due to widespread indexation was a major issue in all stabilisation plans in Brazil, and the 
decrease in indexation after the successful Real Plan, was celebrated as a key evidence of 
victory in the fight against inflation.  
 
Indexation has also other important effects for public policy. For example, the indexation of 
public bonds to the short-term interest rate can decrease the efficiency of monetary policy, 
since an increase in interest rates lead to an increase in bondholders’ wealth. By making the 
short-run Phillips curve more vertical wage indexation affects the trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment (see Fischer and Summers, 1989; and Landerretch et al. (2002). 
Moreover, indexation of prices, and wages in particular, can hinder price flexibility in face of 
supply shocks (Landerretch et al., 2002). Indeed, even strong supporters of indexation such as 
Shiller (1997), are cautious when talking about wage indexation. Schultz (1997) notices that it 
is easier to implement real wage cuts through inflation than by decreasing nominal wages, and 
argues that the lower degree of wage indexation in the U.S. compared to Europe explains the 
lower NAIRU in the former relatively to the latter. 
 
Graph 1 provides a recent and shocking picture of how costly indexation could be when 
things do not go according to plans. From 1994 until 1998 Brazil had the well-known 
combination of a fixed exchange rate regime, an overvalued currency and large current 
account deficits. Given that fragile position, there was a speculative attack against the real 
                                                 
8 For example, a very common way people do calculations when making such kind of decisions is by 
assessing the size of nominal instalments relatively to their income. 
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following the Asian Crisis in 1997, and the Central Bank was obliged to increase sharply the 
interest rate from 19% to 46% per year to defend the parity. Then, following the Russian 
default in 1998 there was a second speculative attack, and once again the Central Bank 
decided to raise the interest rate, now from 19% to over 40%. Since a large share of public 
bonds was indexed to the overnight interest rate, both rises meant a sharp increase in the debt 
to GDP ratio, adding worries about the fiscal side to the already fragile economic outlook. 
 
Graph 1 
Fiscal Performance and Indexed Public Bonds in Brazil 
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Moreover, since the onset of the Asian Crisis the Government had decided to provide an extra 
amount of hedging to the private sector and increased sharply the share of bonds indexed to 
the exchange rate. As a result, when the fixed exchange rate regime collapsed in January 1999 
the debt to GDP ratio soared almost immediately, and more serious concerns about fiscal 
sustainability came to haunt the market. To make matters worse, that strategy remained 
unchanged and fears of a leftist win in the 2002 elections caused further sizeable exchange 
rate depreciation and the debt to GDP ratio reached very high levels prompting fears of 
default once again. The final outcome was a striking increase in the debt to GDP ratio from 
33% to almost 60% in just five years (from the last quarter of 1997 to the last quarter of 
2002), imposing great costs on the Brazilian society for many years ahead. 
 
To summarise, although indexation is a key measure to mitigate the costs of inflation it is not 
a panacea. First, there seems to be a somewhat puzzling resistance to indexation, which 
means that indexation is likely to be limited. Second, even when desirable indexation is not 
perfect so that it does not fully insulate the economy from inflation uncertainty effects. Third, 
indexation may involve important risks. As Friedman (1977) nicely puts “In addition, 
indexing is, even at best, an imperfect substitute for the stability of the inflation rate.” 
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3 – Forecast Failure, Inflation Uncertainty and Rational Expectations 
 
 
“Cynics have suggested that God made economic 
forecasters to make weather forecasters look good. 
But at least weather forecasters can look out the 
window, and with reasonable accuracy know what the 
weather is at the present time. Economic forecasters 
do not have that advantage.” 
 
Donald Brash (1998) 
 
In one of the most ironic and embarrassing situations in economics, while mainstream 
macroeconomics assume axiomatically that agents’ forecasts are accurate and no systematic 
errors are committed, jokes about economists’ ability to forecast flourish outside universities.9 
Indeed, Clements and Hendry (2000) stated that “Forecast failure has occurred sufficiently 
frequently in macroeconomics that ‘economic forecasting’ has come to have some of the 
same connotations as ‘military intelligence’.”, while Zarnowitz (1991) had already recognized 
that “There has been much disenchantment with economic forecasting.” Worse, there is wide 
evidence that forecast failure is particularly high when forecasts are most needed: in turning 
points, increasing its pernicious effects (see Zarnowitz, 1991; Loungani, 2000). Nonetheless, 
the rational expectations paradigm continues to be widely used by economists, both in 
theoretical and applied work, and this has also been the rule in the inflation uncertainty 
econometric literature. For example, Holland (1984) shows how one could test the inflation 
uncertainty-level link: “First, we need an inflation expectations model that provides unbiased 
forecasts over both lower and high inflation periods; we can then test whether the error 
variance is larger for the higher inflation period.”  
 
Surprisingly, it seems that a major reason underlying the gap between theory and practice is 
simply rhetoric. The term rational expectations tailored by Muth (1961), is probably the most 
unfortunate definition in the history of economics. By naming a given expectation formation 
mechanism with the very attribute that distinguishes man from all other living beings, it has 
become extremely difficult to argue against “rationality”, even when used in a very specific 
context and, in fact, has little to do with rationality itself. Indeed, the association is inevitable 
as calling one irrational is pretty much like an insult, which embeds a moral judgment. For 
example, Poole (2001) is extremely careful when arguing that expectations may not be 
rational by stating that: ‘I use the word “nonrational” rather than “irrational” because the 
latter sometimes carries connotations that I do not intend. Expectations may depart from full 
rationality without being “crazy,” “silly,” “emotional,” or “stupid”.’ 
 
As a result, one is able to find many papers in the literature, dealing directly or indirectly with 
rationality, whose conclusions do not match the evidence presented. In some cases, when 
economists find (reluctantly) any evidence against “rationality” they act almost as if 
apologising for that finding. And, when the evidence is overwhelmingly convincing they 
usually try to rationalise features such as bias and systematic forecasts errors and simply 
redefine rational expectations, making it one of the most volatile concepts in economics.10 For 
example, Evans and Wachtel (1993, p. 476), argue that: “An alternative explanation [for 
biased and persistent forecast errors in surveys], which has received less attention, is that 
forecasters are acting rationally, but face a complicated forecasting problem that makes 
systematic forecast errors unavoidable. (…) their forecast errors, although rational, may be 
serially correlated and systematically different from zero.” Similarly, Thomas Jr. (1999) 
                                                 
9 The main point here is not to assess whether most criticism are soundly based or not, but rather to 
recognize the existence of substantial forecast failure in practice. 
10 Another common procedure is to say that expectations are not fully rational, whatever that means. 
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notices that “…unforeseeable “regime changes” can result in forecasts that result in 
systematic errors in certain periods, even when agents are fully rational”. 
 
Regardless of its veracity, such kind of explanation conflicts with the very definition of 
rational expectations, which states that the agent knows the “true model” of the economy.11 
More importantly, what matters for economic theory is not whether forecasts can bear the 
noble attribute of “rationality”, but the consequences of much evidence against its main 
implications: that forecasts should be both unbiased and efficient. Indeed, Cukierman and 
Wachtel (1979, p. 597) explain that “Expectations regarding the general price level are 
formed rationally in the sense that given the currently available information, participants in 
each market use the structure of the economy, which is known to everyone, to form optimal 
forecasts.” Poole (2001) defines in the same way: “By “rational expectations” I mean that 
market outcomes have characteristics as if economic agents are acting on the basis of the 
correct model of how the world works and that they use all available information in deciding 
on their actions”.12 Hence, the main implication of rational expectations is that there is no 
room for systematic forecasting errors and biased forecasts. However, given our limited 
understanding of how the economy works (indeed, disagreement is the rule not the exception 
among economists!), the countless practical difficulties involved in forecasting, such as the 
costs involved in acquiring and processing information, it may not be rational to assume 
rational expectations.13 As Hendry notices (1995) “In general, Muthian expectations are 
economically rational expectations only if there are no costs to discovering the true data 
generating process (d.g.p.), or collecting and processing information: in other words, only if 
econometrics is not needed.” Ironically, one of the first to acknowledge the unreasonable 
assumptions behind Muth’s definition of rationality was Sargent (1993) himself, one of the 
very founders of the rational expectations revolution, who stated that “rational expectations 
models input much more knowledge to the agents within the model … than is possessed by an 
econometrician, who faces estimation and inference problems that the agents in the model 
have somehow solved.” 
 
The pervasiveness of systematic forecast errors in practice shows that economists still have 
much to learn about how agents form their expectations. Even so, as Carroll (2001) points out 
“Yet in recent decades macroeconomists have devoted almost no effort to modelling actual 
empirical expectations data, instead assuming all agents’ expectations are rational.” 
Ironically, one of the most robust evidence that has emerged during this period is that agents’ 
expectations are heavily influenced by past events and, in general, they follow rather than 
anticipate facts. Nordhaus (1987), for example, shows that one prominent feature of actual 
expectations is that they are smooth, which is a sign of inefficiency, since it indicates that 
news are incorporated slowly. Notwithstanding the fact that rational expectations continues to 
be a religion in mainstream macroeconomics new theories are slowly emerging, such as the 
unavoidable “bounded rationality” (see Sargent, 1993), once again not the most appropriate 
name, adaptive learning (see Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) and epidemiological expectations 
(see Carroll, 2001). 
                                                 
11 Note that the term regime change has frequently been inappropriately used as a catchall for justifying 
unexpected outcomes. Moreover, such reasoning leaves many issues answered, such as why after so 
many periods (sometimes years) of, say, inflation underprediction, agents do not review their priors 
about regime change. Such slow learning is difficult to understand from a rational expectations 
perspective. Note also that forecasts produced by such models generate systematic forecast errors by 
construction, in order to match the empirical evidence. This forecasting mechanism is not optimal (see 
Hendry, 2000b, 2003) and may imply large losses in practice. 
12 First impressions on the contrary the expression “all information” is very loose for practical 
purposes, and therefore does not provide a useful benchmark for forecasts to be judged on. Therefore, 
“rationality” is usually divided in its weak and strong forms, in accordance with the information set 
used, but the problem remains unsolved. 
13 One major difficulty is forecasting in a non-stationary world, which is constantly subjected to 
structural breaks (see Clements and Hendry, 1999). 
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One of economists’ major misconceptions is the overwhelming emphasis on unbiased 
forecasts as a major proof of “rationality”, as the following simple example shows. Consider a 
given period in which inflation first rises and then drops, a dynamics similar to the U.S. 
inflationary experience during the 1970s and 1980s. More specifically, consider that in each 
period inflation is driven by the following two-regime random walk with drift process. 
 
⎩⎨
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≤<++−
≤≤++=
−
−
TtT    6.0
Tt1    6.0
11
11
tt
tt
t επ
εππ  (1) 
 
where: π0 = 1 and 11 ≤≤− tε  comes from a uniform distribution and T1 = 25 and T = 50. 
Also, assume that expectations are adaptive and evolve according to the following simple 
mechanism. 
 
11 7.0 −− += tetet  εππ  (2) 
where ettt 111 −−− −= ππε . 
 
Graph 2 shows the simulated inflation series and one-step ahead forecasts (for one sequence 
of draws from the assumed distribution). Although expectations are purely adaptive and 
systematic errors are committed (underprediction in the first half and overprediction in the 
second half), the bias over the whole sample is statistically equal to zero. Therefore, finding 
that a given sequence of forecasts is unbiased does not mean very much in terms of 
rationality. Indeed, when comparing the performance of inflation expectations from the 
Livingstone and Michigan Surveys with that of a naïve, purely backward-looking forecast, 
during the 1960.1–1997.4 period, Thomas Jr. (1999) found that the latter produced a bias 
equal to zero, well below that found in both surveys. When analysing the performance of 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members’ inflation forecasts, Gavin and Mandal 
(2003) concluded that “Interestingly, the naïve inflation forecasts was less biased than the 
FOMC forecasts at the 12-month horizon and they were essentially the same for the 18 and 6-
month horizons.” Graph 2 also shows that the existence of bias depends crucially on the 
sample period considered. Indeed, given a carefully chosen period or a long enough sample 
for a cyclical variable, it would be a surprise if forecasts weren’t unbiased. 
 
Graph 2 
Adaptive Expectations and Unbiased Forecasts 
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Finally, notice that equation (2), which represents the usual textbook adaptive expectation 
mechanism, assumes that the adjustment coefficient is constant over time. However, one 
could devise more elaborate mechanisms, for example one in which the size of the adjustment 
coefficient varies accord to the size and persistence of forecast errors, for example.  
 
11 −− += ttetet  εθππ  (3) 
 
where: ( )L,, 21 −−= ttt f εεθ  and tθ  is not restricted to be 10 ≤≤ tθ , as usually assumed. In 
this case, after a run of systematic errors or few large errors agents may decide, for example, 
to overcorrect (i.e. adjust their expectations by more than the last forecast error, in order to 
catch up with actual inflation). This is a much more plausible adaptive mechanism to consider 
than the didactic but simplistic one given by (2). However, it is much more difficult to be 
dealt with on mathematical grounds. 
 
3.1 – Forecast Failure 
 
This section provides a glimpse on the pervasiveness of forecast failure in practice, more 
specifically, on the evidence portrayed by surveys. The focus is obviously on inflation but 
GDP forecasts will be mentioned too, given its link to inflation through the output gap. 
Loungani (2000) analysed private sector GDP forecasts during recession years for 63 
countries, both developed and developing, from October 1989 to December 1998, and a very 
dismal picture about forecasters’ abilities to predict turning points emerged: among 60 
recession episodes he showed that by the last quarter of the preceding recession year only 3 
cases were predicted. In April of the recession year two thirds of the episodes were not yet 
anticipated although forecasts became more pessimistic, which means that forecasters failed 
to forecast recessions even when they were already underway! Moreover, when the recession 
scenario was finally identified (typically in the last quarter), its magnitude was usually 
underestimated. Therefore, the evidence of bias should not come as a surprise. Indeed, 
forecasts made in April of the recession year presented a significant bias of 1.84 percentage 
points in developed countries and of 4.89 percentage points in developing countries. 
 
Fintzen and Stekler (1999) noticed that U.S. recessions “have generally not been predicted 
prior to their occurrence”. They also pointed out that the 1974, 1981 and 1990 U.S. recessions 
were not recognized even as they occurred. Even considering data revisions and information 
lags this is a very poor record, however it should not come as a shock. Zarnowitz (1986), for 
example, had already noticed for the U.S. that “major failures of forecasting are related to the 
incidence of slowdowns and contractions in general economic activity. (…) Forecasters tend 
to rely heavily on the persistence of trends in spending, output, and the price level.”, which 
means that expectations have a big backward looking component. This finding should not be 
unexpected since this is exactly what is behind econometrics. Econometric-based forecasts 
are intrinsically backward looking, since they rely on three conditions: a) that there are some 
empirical regularities to be captured; b) that the model is able to capture those regularities; c) 
that the future can be predicted using those regularities. Hence, if there are no regularities to 
be captured econometrics is worthless. 
 
Bakhshi and Yates (1998) investigated the “rationality” of the one-year ahead inflation 
forecasts from the Gallup UK employees’ survey of inflation expectations, during the 1984–
1996 period, and from the Barclays Basix survey, during the 1986–1997 period. They found 
that expectations in the former survey systematically overstated inflation by 2.5 percentage 
points on average, and that a one percentage increase in actual inflation led to nearly 0.75 
percentage point increase in expected inflation. Bias was also found in all professional 
categories surveyed by the Barclays Basix survey, although in smaller magnitudes. Moreover, 
he showed evidence that different categories varied sharply in their inflation expectations. 
Brischetto and de Brouwer (1999) analysed a very detailed Australian household survey and, 
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not surprisingly, also found that average inflation expectations vary widely according to 
personal characteristics. People who have better access to information or more developed 
information-processing skills, such as those in professional jobs, more educated or older 
people, tend to have more accurate expectations. Moreover, although higher income earners 
and better-educated people do seem to produce more accurate expectations, they bear some 
problematic features such as “… there is little evidence that people form their expectations 
about future inflation on the basis of the sort of economic relationships highlighted by 
economists.” Indeed, expectations were found not to be correlated with key structural 
determinants of inflation, such as the output gap. 
 
Thomas Jr. (1999) analysed the performance of the one-year-ahead CPI forecasts in the U.S. 
from both the Livingstone and Michigan Surveys during the 1960.1–1997.4 period, and found 
no bias in both surveys when the whole 38 years sample was analysed.14,15 However, when 
the sample was divided in two periods, 1960.1–1980.2, in which inflation trended upwards, 
and 1980.3–1997.4, in which inflation trended downwards, he found very persistent forecast 
errors. There was recurrent under prediction in the former case (mean errors equal to –1.6 and 
–0.3 percentage points, respectively) and over prediction in the latter (mean error equal to  
0.84 and 1.07 percentage points, respectively). Also, expectations were significantly biased in 
both periods for the Livingstone Survey and in the second period for the Michigan Survey. He 
also pointed out that inflation forecasts turning points lagged behind actual inflation turning 
points suggesting “… a strong adaptive or backward-looking element in the formation of 
inflation expectations.” Croushore (1998) also investigated both surveys and the qualitative 
results are similar to those of Thomas Jr (1999), namely: systematic errors during certain sub-
samples but unbiased forecasts over the whole sample. He also investigated the Survey of 
Professional Forecasts (SPF), finding the same pattern once again. 
 
3.2 – Do “Conspiracy Theories” Explain Forecast Failure? 
 
As the last section has shown there is a sharp contrast between the evidence portrayed by 
surveys of expectations and the implications of the rational expectations paradigm. Graphs 3 
and 4 show that discrepancy explicitly, comparing actual U.S. inflation with the mean of one-
year ahead inflation forecasts from the Livingstone and Michigan Surveys. Each point in the 
graph gives actual annual inflation and the corresponding forecast made one year earlier. As 
it can be seen there have been systematic inflation forecasts errors in both surveys. Notice 
also that: a) despite the very different groups being surveyed (economists and households, 
respectively), the pattern of forecast errors is very similar, with systematic underprediction 
during the 1980s, when inflation was rising, and systematic overprediction during the 1980s, 
when inflation was falling. That is, agents usually react to rather than anticipate movements in 
inflation; b) the overprediction continued during the calm 1990s, suggesting that the large 
economic shocks that hit the U.S. economy during the 1970s and first half of the 1980s were 
not the only or perhaps even the main factor behind forecast errors. In other words, forecast 
failure is a much more pervasive phenomenon than one could have thought. Although both 
being U.S. surveys, the same evidence is portrayed by other countries’ surveys as well. 
 
Ironically, this conflicting evidence emerged following economists interests on expectations 
in the wake of the rational expectations revolution in the 1970s. That unexpected situation led 
economists to conclude that either surveys were wrong, not capturing expectations properly, 
or agents were “irrational”. Very conveniently they picked the first option, and turned their 
backs on surveys of expectations. As Croushore (1997) explained when commenting on some 
early scepticism on surveys: “If the survey [the Livingstone Survey] did represent true 
forecasts, people weren’t rational, according to his statistics tests. And that’s hard to believe 
                                                 
14 Croushore (1998) provides a concise summary on those surveys. 
15 However, it should be pointed out that the size of mean errors are probably economically relevant, 
and amounted to –0.48 and 0.33 percentage points, respectively. 
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because people would lose money in financial markets if they weren’t rational.” This kind of 
conclusion that emerged early on in the survey literature is both simplistic and flawed. 
 
Graph 3 
One-Year Ahead Livingstone Forecasts vs. CPI Inflation 
 
0%
3%
6%
9%
12%
15%
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
CPI Inflation Livingstone  
 
Graph 4 
One-Year Ahead Michigan Forecasts Vs. CPI Inflation 
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Despite the disbelief from the economics profession, surveys of expectations mushroomed 
after the 1970s, and today they have turned into a valuable source of information both to 
businessman and the government alike, especially central banks. And, although the bulk of 
the profession continues to ignore such evidence, as it became clearer that the initial 
disappointing results were actually correct, economists came up with more elaborate 
arguments to cope with that embarrassing situation.16 The reasons usually hinge on the notion 
of “strategic behaviour” by agents, in which either they do not have the proper incentive to 
provide their true expectations, due to several reasons, or they have other objectives when 
                                                 
16 Moreover, economists who have taken seriously the evidence portrayed by surveys have found that 
empirical macro models work better when model-consistent expectations are replaced by survey-based 
expectations [e.g. Roberts (1997, 1998)]. 
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predicting.17 For example, it has been argued that disclosure may influence agents’ reporting, 
since once individual forecasters are identified they may also seek to market themselves 
producing bold forecasts instead of providing their best ones. According to Croushore (1997) 
this is the reason why the Livingstone Survey does not identify individual forecasts. It has 
also been argued that there is herding behaviour (i.e. forecasters seek to stick close to the 
consensus, so as to when forecasts are wrong they do not look bad relatively to others). 
 
Although the sort of “conspiracy theories” mentioned above is plausible in theory, it is really 
difficult to believe that they are responsible for both the bulk and pervasiveness of forecast 
failure in practice. Rather, they are likely to be, to a large extent, rationalisations. Moreover, 
there is no way to get rid of some of them. For example, one can always argue that whenever 
a survey does not identify individual forecasts one has little incentive to be accurate, since 
getting it right will not be translated into higher reputation. However, one could also argue 
that visibility could either induce someone to make bold forecasts to gain publicity or to 
converge to the consensus in order to hedge against large forecast errors. Therefore, one’s 
objection is another one’s solution. Furthermore, instead of strategic herd behaviour there 
could be a genuine consensus given that most forecasters share basically the same information 
(although backgrounds do vary a lot). The argument of publicity is also hard to be taken 
seriously. While it is certainly possible that once in a while one tries to stick out from the 
crowd, just a few large forecasts errors could ruin one’s reputation if the forecasts are far from 
the consensus. Finally, and most important, the evidence portrayed by surveys is basically the 
same regardless whether the survey is anonymous or not, and whether those surveyed are 
common citizens or professional forecasters, as Graphs 3 and 4 have shown. 
 
However, one could argue that the ultimate evidence in this regard is provided by central 
banks’ forecasts, since the usual objections concerning private surveys do not apply to 
forecasts from high reputable central banks, especially those operating under inflation 
targeting frameworks. Those central banks have all the incentives to produce good inflation 
forecasts, since price stability is their main objective. Furthermore, accurate forecasts are 
directly linked to obtaining and maintaining credibility. Not surprisingly central banks have 
large research staffs, with high-qualified economists, working exclusively to understand how 
the economy works and using several different models, which are constantly updated, to 
produce good forecasts. Finally, central banks are intrinsically forwarding looking and their 
forecasts are the result of both carefully designed econometric models and inputs from 
experts’ judgments.  
 
Brash (1998) gives a very good account of what is behind the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
forecasts, the first central bank to adopt inflation targeting: “The Reserve Bank devotes very 
considerable effort to its projections. We study a very wide range of data from New Zealand 
sources of production, prices, wages, money supply, bank credit, business and household 
confidence, and much more. (…) Before each quarterly projection, a group of Reserve Bank 
Staff fans out across the country and talks to upwards of 40 businesses and business 
organisations to get an up-to-the-minute impression of what a small number of – hopefully – 
representative firms are experiencing. (…) We talk to Statistics New Zealand to try to get an 
understanding of what lies behind some of the statistics. We talk to the producer boards to get 
an understanding of what is happening in the agricultural sector. As a result, we go into each 
quarterly projection “round” armed with a very great deal of information on the New Zealand 
Economy.” Although being just a partial quote, it should be more than enough to convince 
one about the huge effort behind central banks’ inflation forecasts. Even so, Brash does not 
share the same certainties of academic rational expectations economists and points out 
humbly that: “The only way the Reserve Bank could avoid the embarrassment of being wrong 
about the future at least as often as being right would be to stop publishing our projections.” 
 
                                                 
17 See, for example, Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) and Laster et al. (1999). 
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Indeed, McCaw and Ranchhod (2002) analysed the Reserve Bank CPI forecasts from 
December 1994 to September 2002 and showed that CPI inflation had been systematically 
under-predicted during that period. The under prediction amounted to almost 0.7 percentage 
points in one year ahead forecasts and nearly 0.9 percentage points in two years ahead 
forecasts. Those biases are large by themselves, however when one considers that during most 
of this period inflation was supposed to be kept below 3%, they are even more meaningful. 
They noticed that the usual assumption of unchanged interest rates when forecasts are made 
changed after mid-1997, when a path for interest rates (and also the real exchange rate) has 
begun to be assumed. However, interestingly, when they compared the forecast performance 
in the two periods, one-year ahead average forecast errors turned out to be higher in the 
second period. Despite the smaller magnitudes involved, the Bank of England has also been 
criticised by committing systematic inflation forecasts errors. Wadhwani (2002) a former 
member of the Bank’s MPC notices that “… the actual outturn for inflation has always been 
lower than the MPC’s two-year ahead forecast, with an average error of up to around 0.5%”. 
He also pointed out that “Moreover, inflation appears to have come in below the published 
Inflation Report forecasts in the pre-Bank independence period as well (Table 2).” Then he 
shows that from the first quarter of 1995 until the last quarter of 2001 two-year ahead 
inflation forecasts overestimated inflation by nearly 0.3 percentage points on average. 
 
Gavin and Mandal (2003) evaluated the performance of FOMC members’ inflation forecasts 
for the 1979–2001 period, which are highly relevant since they pertain to those that actually 
take monetary policy decisions. They analysed calendar year inflation forecasts made 18, 12 
and 6 months in advance, and showed evidence of “… substantial bias in inflation forecasts”, 
as well as systematic forecast errors during the whole period. More specifically, inflation was 
systematically overpredicted in all three forecast horizons. The bias amounted to 0.47, 0.36 
and 0.23 for the 18, 12 and 6 months forecasts, respectively, which is a very meaningful result 
given the long span involved. They also compared FOMC members’ forecasts with those 
produced by their research staff to support them in their monetary policy decisions, which are 
the ones included in the well-known Green Book, and the results remained unaltered. 
 
It has been suggested that analysing central banks’ inflation forecasts based on the assumption 
of unchanged interest rates may not be appropriate (e.g. Blix et al., 2001). However the 
evidence does not seem to support this claim as McCaw and Ranchhod (2002) showed for 
New Zealand. Indeed, according to their study the opposite result (i.e. less bias) is more likely 
to be true. The same evidence was found by Wadhwani (2004) for England who notices that 
“We use constant interest rate forecasts in the analysis here. However, the results obtained 
with forecasts conditioned on market interest rates are very similar.” It is not difficult to come 
up with some reasons why this is so. First, monetary policy acts with lags, so one-year ahead 
inflation is in a great extent given at current interest rates. Second, in economies close to their 
long run equilibrium path interest rates moves are usually gradual and small, with limited 
influence on the forecast horizons analysed. Third, like other financial variables nominal 
interest rates are very difficult to forecast, and trying to predict a path for future rates adds 
another source of errors in predictions. Therefore, this point seems to be overemphasized. 
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4 – Empirical Measures of Inflation Uncertainty  
 
 
The study of inflation uncertainty gained prominence since the seminal work of Okun (1971). 
Arguing against proposals that the U.S should accept higher inflation rates, he claimed a very 
intuitive idea: that inflation variability (and, therefore, uncertainty) is positively related to the 
inflation level. He showed the existence of a positive correlation between average inflation 
and inflation variability (measured by its standard deviation) for a cross-section of the 17 
most industrialized OECD countries. Since Okun’s paper the above link has become a hot and 
controversial topic amongst economists. Indeed, in that same issue, Gordon (1971) dismissed 
Okun’s claim, arguing that his results were conditional on the chosen sample period (1951–
68). He noted that in the aftermath of the Korean War prices behaviour was unusual, and 
divided Okun’s sample in two periods, showing that for the second (supposedly normal) 
period (1960–68) that correlation was much weaker. 
 
Using a larger sample (41 countries) and a longer period (1949–1970), Logue and Willet 
(1976) reproduced Okun’s work reaching the same conclusion, even when they divided the 
sample into two periods: 1949–1959 and 1960–1970. However, when the sample was divided 
according to countries types, they did not found the same evidence for highly industrialized 
countries, except for the first period. The same lack of support was found when countries 
were split according to their inflation rates.18 In that case, Okun’s claim was not supported for 
low inflation countries (2%-4% range), a similar result from Gordon’s (1971). Calling into 
question claims that the U.S. inflation, which had been high but steady, should not be 
reduced, Klein (1975) highlighted a very important point: the difference between short-run 
and long-run price uncertainty. He showed that under the “new” fiduciary monetary standard 
inflation was not negatively autocorrelated as it used to be during the gold standard years, 
which meant that price increases were no longer expected to be reversed. He argued that even 
though short-term inflation variability was relatively low at the U.S. at that time, high long-
run uncertainty was behind the observed decrease in the average maturity of corporate debt 
issues. Although Ibrahim and Williams (1978) called into question Klein’s measures of short 
and long-run price unpredictability (which were based on moving averages), their findings 
supported Klein’s conclusions. 
 
Some years after Okun’s work, his claim gained the important support of Friedman (1977) 
who, during his Nobel Prize Lecture, stated that “Rather, the higher the [inflation] rate, the 
more variable it is likely to be” and “… it is unlikely that inflation would be as fully 
anticipated at high as at low rates of inflation”. Hence, for Friedman more variable inflation 
also meant more uncertain inflation. Foster (1978) called into question the use of standard 
deviations as a measure of inflation uncertainty, by giving the following example: assume that 
inflation is increasing following a deterministic linear trend. In this case, both the inflation 
level and its standard deviation are increasing over time, nonetheless inflation is perfectly 
anticipated. He argued that measures reflecting year-to-year changes in inflation are more 
suitable to measure variability, and used the average absolute change in inflation from year-
to-year as a measure of variability. Even so, Foster did find strong support for Okun’s claim. 
However, he remained somewhat cautious about taking strong conclusions from cross-section 
studies, noting that the results could be reflecting only differences amongst countries’ 
economic and governmental structure (e.g. ineptness of controlling inflation). 
 
Taylor (1981) reproduced Okun’s study with fewer countries and a longer period, and also 
found support for Okun’s claim. Similarly to Gordon’s (1971), he found the correlation to be 
much weaker in the 1960s than in the 1970s. He then estimated simple inflation forecasting 
                                                 
18 They tested the above hypothesis running a simple regression of variability (measured by the 
standard deviation of inflation) on a constant and the average inflation rate. 
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models for each of the 7 countries and showed that the forecasts’ error standard deviation was 
strongly correlated to the average inflation rate. Fischer (1981) found evidence for the U.S. of 
a positive correlation between inflation variability and its level. Acknowledging that 
variability and uncertainty are not necessarily the same thing, he found evidence of a positive 
association between inflation uncertainty, measured by the variance of survey inflation 
forecasts, and both actual and expected inflation.19 Next he ran a regression of Engle’s (1983) 
estimated conditional variance on a constant and quarterly GNP deflator and did not find a 
significant relation between them. 
 
Few years after Friedman’s influential statements, the controversy was boosted when Engle 
(1983), using his new ARCH technique, found evidence for the U.S. that “the variance of 
inflation in the seventies was only slightly greater than in the sixties and both were well 
below the variance in the late forties and early fifties”. As a result, Engle dismissed claims 
that the inflation level was positively correlated to inflation uncertainty in the U.S. and, in 
spite of an overwhelming amount of evidence to the contrary, made the remarkable statement 
that “Although the level of inflation in the seventies was high, it was predictable”. This 
remark was even more surprising given that Engle (1982) had previously stated that “Thus, 
the standard deviation of inflation increased from 0.6 per cent to 1.5 per cent over a few 
years, as the economy moved from the rather predictable sixties into the chaotic seventies” 
 
Pagan et al. (1983) also criticised the loose use of the concept variability. They developed a 
theoretical model akin to Lucas (1973) in order to investigate commonly used measures of 
variability and criticised the traditional tests of regressing variability on the inflation level, 
suggesting some measures in order to get robust inferences from that framework. They 
showed that the inflation level-variability hypothesis could be investigated by testing for 
heteroscedasticity, and investigated the link using consumers’ expectations data from the 
Australian Morgan Poll, finding a positive association. They also tested the hypothesis by 
deriving inflation expectations from an econometric model and once more found (weaker) 
evidence that higher inflation means more uncertain inflation. Holland (1984) estimated two 
inflation-forecasting models for the U.S. and showed that the positive correlation disappeared 
when relative energy prices were included in the model. Indeed, Taylor (1981) had previously 
shown that a great deal of inflation variability in the U.S. was due to supply shocks, and 
Engle (1983) conclusions were based in a regression that included energy prices. Then 
Holland showed that inflation uncertainty, measured by both the standard deviation of six-
month inflation forecasts among respondents and the root mean squared error of individual 
forecasts in the Livingstone Survey, were positively correlated to both the actual and expected 
inflation rates. He concluded that the inflation uncertainty-level link hypothesis depends on 
both the chosen econometric specification and the method used for measuring uncertainty. 
 
To illustrate his new GARCH technique Bollerslev (1986) also estimated inflation uncertainty 
measures, reaching basically the same conclusions as Engle (1983). Using the actual data 
employed in Engle (1983), Cosimano and Jansen (1988) criticised Engle’s work claiming that 
his model was highly mis-specified: not only did the errors showed strong autocorrelation but 
the fitted model ignored a structural break around 1954. When the structural break was taken 
properly into account and appropriate lag lengths were used, their results showed that the 
heteroscedasticity vanished. Nonetheless, their results implied that inflation level and 
uncertainty were uncorrelated for the U.S. Ball and Cecchetti (1990) argued that the 
conflicting evidence was due to the fact that different studies had measured uncertainty over 
different time horizons. They developed a statistical model in which inflation is subject to 
both temporary and permanent shocks, and estimate it both across countries and over time. 
While the latter shift trend inflation, the former only produce short-run deviations from trend. 
Some of their conclusions are: a) next quarter’s uncertainty is basically determined by the 
variance of temporary shocks, while long-run uncertainty depends mainly on the variance of 
                                                 
19 He used both the Livingston and Michigan Surveys of expectations.  
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permanent shocks; b) current inflation level affects mainly long-run uncertainty; c) the 
inflation uncertainty-level link across countries differs from the relation over time in a given 
country, since in the former case both short and long-run uncertainty rise with inflation; d) 
high inflation raises both the variability and the inflation uncertainty. 
 
Evans (1991) estimated a time-varying autoregressive equation, AR(1), with ARCH errors to 
obtain both short-run and long-run inflation uncertainty measures. He shows evidence that 
after 1970 long-run uncertainty and actual inflation are positively linked. However he found 
an unexpected negative link between short-run uncertainty and the inflation level.20 Brunner 
and Hess (1993) argued that the symmetry assumption underlying ARCH models (i.e. both 
positive and negative shocks have the same effect on uncertainty) is inconsistent with 
Friedman’s hypothesis. They estimated a state-dependent model, which allows the conditional 
moments to be nonlinear functions of the state variables, including lagged values of inflation, 
forecast errors and the conditional variance, and found that symmetry is easily rejected for the 
U.S., and that higher inflation is indeed less predictable, contradicting Engle and Bollerslev’s 
findings. Inflation uncertainty was found to be higher during the 1970s and 1980s than in the 
late 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, once symmetry was imposed they found the same results as 
Engle (1983), Bollerslev (1986) and Cosimano and Jansen (1988). Finally, they found strong 
evidence linking uncertainty to past forecast errors and to a lesser extent to past inflation.21  
 
Kim (1993) investigated the inflation uncertainty-level link estimating an unobserved 
components model with a Markov–switching heteroscedasticity. Like Ball and Cecchetti 
(1990), Kim tried to distinguish between short and long-run uncertainty by modelling 
inflation as having both a stochastic trend and a stationary component. Like Cosimano and 
Jansen (1988) he also found a structural break in inflation in the mid-1950s. Kim modelled 
U.S. inflation as having four different regimes and found evidence that higher inflation was 
positively related to higher long-run uncertainty. However, as did Evans (1991) he found that 
short-run uncertainty increases when inflation falls, which is not an intuitive result.22 Golob 
(1994) argued that those studies that had not been able to find a (positive) link were flawed 
because they ignored a downtrend in inflation uncertainty in the U.S. over time, and once that 
factor is taken into account the evidence is unambiguous. He obtained inflation uncertainty 
proxies from inflation forecasting models for both the CPI and its core, and regressed those 
proxies on a constant and lagged inflation, including also a time trend. He did find that higher 
inflation increases uncertainty, but the time trend was (negatively) significant only in the core 
inflation equation, which shows that the evidence on his hypothesis cannot be seen as robust 
for the CPI. 
 
Since around Golob’s paper the inflation uncertainty-level link (econometric) debate has 
lessened somewhat, and the overwhelming majority of papers have basically shared the same 
methodology: using in-sample conditional variance estimates from GARCH-type models as 
proxies for inflation uncertainty.23 Two recurrent issues have been: testing for asymmetric 
effects and the direction of “causality” between the inflation level and inflation uncertainty. 
                                                 
20 The conditional standard deviation of next month’s inflation and next month’s expected inflation 
were supposed to measure short run uncertainty, while the conditional standard deviation of steady 
state inflation was supposed to measure long run uncertainty. The first two measures were significantly 
differently, especially their levels, what is an unexpected result. Also, the short-run measure of 
uncertainty was much higher than the long run, which is another counter-intuitive result. 
21 The authors noticed that there was a trade-off between the inclusion of lagged forecast errors and 
lagged inflation in the conditional variance. 
22 In his model short and long run uncertainty were measured by the probability of a high variance state 
for temporary and permanent shocks, respectively. 
23 For example, Grier and Perry (1998) investigate the inflation-uncertainty link for the G7 countries. 
Both Fountas (2001) and Kontonikas (2004) investigate the link for the UK, while Daal et al. (2005) 
investigate the inflation-uncertainty link for the G7 countries as well as some emerging countries. All 
of them use GARCH-type models. 
 22
Most papers find a positive link and, to a lesser extent, asymmetric effects. 
 
4.1 – Surveys 
 
Another way of measuring inflation uncertainty is to use surveys of expectations.24 A major 
point of discussion in the inflation-uncertainty survey literature is to what extent disagreement 
among forecasters can be taken as a proxy for uncertainty. Cukierman and Wachtel (1979) 
built a model of disagreement akin to the Lucas limited information model where, despite 
having rational expectations, economic agents in different markets have different inflation 
expectations, since each market faces idiosyncratic shocks. Analysing the evidence, using 
both the Livingstone and Michigan surveys, they found that periods when people disagree 
more tend to come together with periods of large inflation and nominal income variances, 
confirming their model’s predictions. The authors claimed that their results supported the idea 
that the inflation level and disagreement are positively correlated and that higher 
disagreement leads to more frequent forecast errors. 
 
Bomberger and Frazer (1981) investigated the effects of expected inflation and inflation 
uncertainty on interest rates. They argued that current uncertainty should be affected by recent 
forecasts errors and, therefore, if disagreement is to be a useful proxy of uncertainty it has to 
be correlated with a measure that quantifies the extent of forecast errors. They show that a 
geometric declining weighted average of squared past forecast errors series from the 
Livingstone Survey tracked really well disagreement over the 1952–1977 period, concluding 
that disagreement is a good proxy of uncertainty. Fischer (1981) showed some evidence, for 
both the Livingstone and Michigan surveys, that disagreement was positively correlated to 
past, current and expected inflation during the 1954–1980 period. Moreover, for the latter 
survey he also found a positive link between uncertainty and lagged unanticipated inflation 
(i.e. past forecast errors). Holland (1984) also showed that disagreement in the Livingstone 
Survey six-month ahead inflation forecasts was positively correlated to both actual and 
expected inflation rates during the 1954.2–1983.2 period. 
 
In an interesting paper Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) pointed out that although Bomberger 
and Frazer results were suggestive, past forecast errors are only one part of uncertainty, which 
also includes forwarding looking components. In order to measure uncertainty one needs to 
know the probability distribution associated with each individual forecast. So they used some 
data rare in economics, the Survey of Professional Forecasts (SPF), which captures not only 
point forecasts from respondents but also the uncertainty around those forecasts, and found 
that disagreement (measured by the standard deviation of point forecasts across survey 
respondents) understates uncertainty (measured by the average standard deviation of 
individual probability distributions), mainly for short horizons. Moreover, they found the 
former to be much more volatile than the latter. Indeed, uncertainty was found to be 
surprisingly stable. Also, while disagreement increased strongly and monotonically with the 
forecast horizon, uncertainty barely increased, which is not a very intuitive result. At the end 
they found evidence that disagreement was weakly correlated to uncertainty during the period 
analysed (1968.4–1981.2). However, intriguingly, they found a very strong correlation 
between disagreement in the Livingston Survey and uncertainty in the SPF, providing 
(indirect) evidence in favour of using the former as a useful proxy of uncertainty. Overall they 
found strong evidence that higher inflation also means higher inflation uncertainty.25 
 
Lahiri et al. (1988) also investigated whether disagreement is a good proxy for uncertainty 
                                                 
24 Note that Fischer (1981), Pagan (1983) and Holland (1984) have also used surveys in their 
investigation. 
25 Notice, however, that when point forecasts and disagreement were used in the SPF, this link was not 
found. This was another puzzling result, but the authors did not analyse it. 
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using the SPF, and like Zarnowitz and Lambros (Z&L) (1987) found evidence that the former 
understates the latter. The results showed two important differences, though. First, the two 
measures’ magnitudes were closer to one another, while in Z&L´ work disagreement was 
much lower. Second, uncertainty was found to be much more volatile than in Z&L’ study. 
The two measures, therefore, were much more correlated than in Z&L. Nonetheless, based 
apparently solely on visual inspection they concluded unwarrantedly “On the whole, the 
disagreement measure does not seem to be a good proxy for the underlying uncertainty.” 
Finally, the authors ran a regression of uncertainty on inflation and found some evidence that 
higher inflation increases uncertainty. Using data from the Livingstone Survey Golob (1994) 
provided evidence that expected inflation for the next 6 and 12 months were positively 
correlated to disagreement. 
 
Bomberger (1996) revisited the question whether disagreement is a good proxy for 
uncertainty, but using a different approach and dataset from Z&L.26 He argued that the 
conditional variance of inflation about an individual forecast (i.e. individual uncertainty) 
should be positively related to disagreement if the hypothesis is to be confirmed. By 
decomposing individual error into consensus error and disagreement error, he found that a 
major component in individual uncertainty, measured by the mean squared error of individual 
forecasts, is due to consensus uncertainty, and that the former is around four times larger than 
disagreement. Therefore, he argued that if disagreement is to be a good proxy for individual 
uncertainty it must also track consensus uncertainty. He tested the hypothesis econometrically 
and found evidence that consensus uncertainty was proportional to disagreement and, 
therefore, to individual uncertainty, supporting the use of disagreement as a measure of 
uncertainty. Therefore, Bomberger does not find evidence that disagreement is more volatile 
than uncertainty, as suggested by Z&L. 
 
4.2 – An Assessment of the Evidence 
 
Despite the lack of consensus in the inflation uncertainty-level literature, when one weighs 
carefully the evidence some clear conclusions arise. First, there has historically been a sharp 
contrast between the evidence conveyed by econometric models and that portrayed by both 
surveys of expectations and simple uncertainty measures. While the last two show 
overwhelming evidence that inflation uncertainty is positively related to the inflation level, 
the former has often find no such a link. Second, there has been nonetheless a convergence 
between the econometric and survey literatures, as the evidence from the latest econometric 
studies has been similar to what surveys have been showing for a long time. Once dismissed 
by economists as not representing expectations properly, surveys have proven to be reliable. 
Third, while it is theoretically true that variability does not mean uncertainty, this distinction 
has not proven to be very relevant in practice. It has been widely recognized that the more 
volatile a given variable is the more difficult it is to be forecast. Indeed, Hendry (2000a) states 
that “…periods of forecast failure and economic turbulence often go hand in glove…”, while 
Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) argue that “For any time series, increased volatility tends to 
be associated with decreased predictability.” 
 
More specifically, the evidence shows, not surprisingly, that econometric inflation uncertainty 
proxies and the qualitative evidence thereof are very sensitive to the specification and 
methodology used. Holland (1993), for example, points to the different results from fixed and 
non-fixed parameter studies. Indeed, lack of robustness has proven to be one major drawback 
of econometric proxies relative to those derived from surveys, where the forecasting method 
is not an issue. While the former usually rejects Okun’s hypothesis the latter provides wide 
support. Note, however, that one important exception has been found in recent studies that use 
asymmetric (G)ARCH models. This evidence is highly relevant since those models show that 
the symmetry restriction embedded in traditional (G)ARCH models, which have been widely 
                                                 
26 He used The Livingston Survey over the 1949–94 period. 
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used to deny Okun’s hypothesis, is usually rejected by the data.27 Even so, it remains an open 
issue to what extent (G)ARCH-type models are actually the result of mis-specificaton since, 
for example, outliers and autocorrelated errors could produce such type of errors. Ironically, 
although Engle (1983) had warned that: “The weakness of the procedure is that if the model 
[ARCH] is mis-specified, the estimates of the conditional variances will be biased. This 
points out the importance of carrying out various specification tests.”, Cosimano and Jansen 
(1988) showed that Engle’s ARCH effects were due to mis-specification.  
 
Despite the recent convergence, one should note that: first, it seems that one factor behind the 
conflicting evidence is that the econometric proxies found in the literature almost always 
focus on short-run uncertainty, typically one quarter-ahead. In its turn, survey proxies focus 
on longer term uncertainty, usually derived from six and twelve months ahead forecasts. This 
is odd since the short-run is not the most relevant uncertainty dimension pinpointed by 
economic theory. Second, despite the qualitative convergence brought by recent studies the 
quantitative evidence remains highly dependent on the specification/method used. Therefore, 
care should be taken if one aims at deriving econometric inflation uncertainty proxies for 
hypothesis testing. Finding support for the inflation uncertainty-level link and measuring 
uncertainty reliably are two connected but different matters, and this leads us to the next 
point. Third, and more importantly, as noted before the econometric proxies found in the 
literature are temporally inconsistent, since they come from (in-sample) “forecasts” that use 
future information. In contrast, survey proxies comes from surveys forecasts, which, by 
definition, are out-of-sample forecasts, since no forecaster knows the future. This temporal 
restriction should also be imposed in econometric studies, and very likely accounts for the 
bulk of the divergence between both literatures. 
 
As called to attention earlier on, the temporal inconsistency problem is a much broader issue 
than just using future information to “forecast” a variable. It could also arise due to hindsight, 
since in the future the forecaster will obviously have a much better understanding of the 
variable dynamics, and the “forecasts” will benefit from that ex post knowledge. It was also 
pointed out that an uncomfortable feature of recent studies is that they are theoretically 
inconsistent, since they use modern techniques to estimate inflation in periods when those 
techniques and the necessary technology were actually unavailable. Curiously, the 
convergence mentioned above has arisen with the most recent studies, suggesting that those 
models may end up actually providing better proxies for uncertainty. One explanation for this 
paradox is that even though they are theory inconsistent, those proxies are more realistic since 
they come from models that impose fewer restrictions on the data. For example, time-varying 
parameter models and asymmetric ARCH models do not impose parameter constancy and 
symmetry, respectively. This fact highlights that imposing untested restrictions in 
econometric models may produce very misleading results. However, other factors could also 
lie behind this convergence, and a more detailed analysis of those studies is certainly needed. 
 
For example, one problem regards how some recent models measure long-run uncertainty. 
Ball and Cecchetti (1990) and Kim (1993) distinguish short and long run uncertainty by 
modelling inflation as having both a permanent (random walk) and a stationary component. 
This leads to the question of how able agents are in practice in differentiating temporary from 
permanent shocks to inflation (see Brash’s comments above). Even if a shock is claimed to be 
permanent (say, a one time jump in oil prices) policy could counteract and keep inflation 
under control, so that the definition depends on policymaker’s reactions and credibility. It 
seems unrealistic to assume that agents have this kind of knowledge unless until some time 
after the events. Moreover, both types of shocks are usually treated as orthogonal which 
cannot be taken for granted. One can also question the relation between long run uncertainty 
and the permanent component of inflation, since there is no explicit forecast horizon involved. 
                                                 
27 Golob (1994) argues that ARCH models are inadequate since they constrain uncertainty to change 
slowly over time. 
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This opens the possibility, for example, that uncertainty about next-quarter inflation is 
labelled as long run as long as it refers to the permanent component of inflation, which could 
be problematic. Finally, in many industrial countries inflation has been very well behaved 
since the 1990s, and it could well have become a stationary process. If this is true, the above 
definition of long-term uncertainty does not make sense. In ts turn regime-switching models 
are problematic also since in order to assess how many inflationary regimes the economy 
faced one needs to know the whole history of inflation, and even so the task is not 
straightforward. For example, Kim (1991) modelled US inflation as having four different 
regimes but Evans and Watchel (1993) considered only two. 
 
Finally, even though asymmetric (G)ARCH models are much more sensible than their 
symmetric counterparts, the underlying presumption remains that a negative inflation shock is 
bad news and, therefore, harmful. However, this may be inadequate, and the following odd 
situation may arise: inflation has been decreasing and economic agents overpredicting it, but 
uncertainty is considered to be increasing and harmful. In this case of negative errors it is 
more plausible that inflation uncertainty not only falls but also is beneficial, since inflation is 
decreasing faster than expected, which is good news. In other words: things are improving 
faster than anticipated. This situation is relevant since the evidence shows that agents usually 
underpredict inflation when it is rising and overpredict inflation when it is falling. This 
problem may help to explain why both Evans (1991) and Kim (1993) found evidence that 
short-run uncertainty increases when inflation falls. A better alternative is to include both 
forecast errors themselves and their absolute values in the models, since in this case no 
symmetry restriction is imposed and negative errors are allowed to act as good news, which 
should decrease uncertainty. Finally, another limitation of econometric uncertainty proxies is 
that they usually do not take into account both parameter and model uncertainty. However, it 
is not easy how to solve satisfactorily those problems. 
 
In its turn, the inflation level-uncertainty survey literature is much smaller than its 
econometric counterpart and shares a much wider agreement.28 A major issue in the former is 
whether disagreement is a valid proxy of uncertainty. Although there are compelling 
theoretical reasons why both should be closely related (e.g. no one knows the true model), 
this link has been difficult to formalise. Also, a key part of the empirical evidence, which is 
based on probability forecasts from the SPF, is not as convincing as one would like. 
Moreover, a crucial issue that has been overlooked is to what extent inferences from the SPF 
probability forecasts are actually reliable. Three main reasons ask for caution: first, the SPF 
inflation probabilistic forecasts refer to the GDP deflator (and not the CPI), which is not the 
index people in general are more interested in.29 This lack of interest probably lies behind the 
fall in the number of SPF respondents through time, and helps to explain why the survey 
briefly ended in early 1990.30 Second, what forecasters are judged is on their point forecasts 
and not on their underlying probability distributions, which “are not subject to any market 
test.” (Batchelor and Dua, 1993). This fact certainly explains why not every forecaster 
provides probability forecasts for the SPF. Thus, more weight should be put on point 
forecasts. Third, and more serious, even though one has to assume a probability distribution in 
order to extract the implied expected inflation, Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) found 
important differences between point forecasts and individual expected values in the SPF. 
Although they minimised that discrepancy, the evidence is very disturbing. Defining large 
discrepancies as differences between the two measures exceeding one percentage point, they 
say that “only about one in four of the regular respondents had 20 percent or more of such 
deviations on the record, and only one in twenty had 40 percent or more.” Those are large 
                                                 
28 Note that although the literature on surveys of expectations is large, many papers do not focus on 
inflation uncertainty nor on the level-uncertainty link, but on the rationality of forecasts. 
29 Thirteen years after the survey had begun, in 1981, the CPI began to be surveyed, but only point 
forecasts are asked. 
30 Later in 1990, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia took over and revived the survey.  
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numbers to be ignored! The fact that individual expected inflation values frequently did not 
match inflation point forecasts, should make one very cautions about using the former for 
inference. 
 
It should be noted, however, that although no strong consensus has yet been formed on 
whether disagreement is a good proxy for uncertainty, some stylised facts emerge from this 
literature evidence. First, the magnitude of forecast errors is positively related to the inflation 
level. This is crucial evidence in favour of the inflation uncertainty-level link, since it is 
exactly the variance of forecast errors which is the measure of forecast uncertainty obtained 
from econometric models. Second, forecast errors are also positively linked to disagreement. 
This means that at times when individuals commit more errors are also times in which they 
disagree more, reflecting the greater underlying uncertainty about the future economic 
outlook. Also, one should be more uncertain about one’s own forecasts if forecasts produced 
by other forecasters are very different from one’s own, given that no one knows the true 
model. Third, there is broad evidence that disagreement increases with the inflation level, 
expected inflation and the forecast horizon. These stylised facts provide significant support 
for the use of disagreement as a proxy for inflation uncertainty. 
 
Surveys also show that the higher volatility that comes with higher inflation also means more 
inflation uncertainty, supporting the findings from earlier studies that used simple variability 
measures to proxy inflation uncertainty. Indeed, Brunner and Hess (1993) found evidence that 
changes in inflation are even more relevant in explaining inflation uncertainty in their model 
than forecast errors. Crawford and Kasumovich (1996) mentioned (but did not present 
evidence) that research at the Bank of Canada found that although one-year ahead forecast 
errors from a Canadian survey were related to inflation level they were more related to 
changes in inflation. Finally, one must recognise that despite the existence of a clear link 
between the inflation level and the degree of inflation uncertainty, the latter can be high even 
when inflation is low. For example, inflation uncertainty can be high when agents assess that 
there is some probability that, say, a fixed exchange rate regime could collapse in the near 
future and the associated devaluation could boost inflation. This is the well known peso 
problem, and if it is not taken into account properly when testing the inflation uncertainty-
level link, then misleading inferences might arise. 
 
 
5 – Inflation Uncertainty and Forecast Failure in Brazil 
 
 
Brazil has a history of chronic macroeconomic instability, in which the major component was 
the persistent inflationary disarray that lasted until 1994. From 1950 until 1979 the average 
annual CPI inflation rate in Brazil was around 32% and its standard deviation 21%. The 
outlook got much worse after 1980, when annual inflation rates exceeded the 100% mark and 
began to increase very rapidly forcing policymakers to implement several stabilisation plans, 
which by themselves became an extra source of uncertainty. Indeed, from 1980 until 1996 the 
average annual CPI inflation rate in Brazil was about 370% and its standard deviation 
amounted to staggering 790%. Moreover, given the obvious links between economic 
variables, the inflation disarray also produced uncertainty on other key economic variables 
such as interest rates and the exchange rate, worsening the macroeconomic uncertainty. 
 
Graph 5 shows the dismal history of chronic high inflation in Brazil in the 30-year period 
from January 1975 to January 2005. It also shows the several stabilisation plans that were put 
in place to curb inflation. Monthly rates are shown since the magnitudes involved in quarterly 
and annual figures makes it even harder to visualise the lower inflation periods. However, in 
order to provide an idea of the annual magnitudes involved some remarks are useful: a) 
inflation reached the 100% barrier in 1980, and began to increase very rapidly thereafter; b) 
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the first stabilisation plan, The Cruzado Plan, was implemented in the end of February 1986, 
after inflation left behind the 200% mark in the previous year; c) inflation reached 1,000% in 
1988; d) in the last twelve months before the implementation of the successful Real Plan, in 
July 1994, inflation had reached staggering 5,000%; e) in 1975 inflation was 31%, the lowest 
level before 1995, and reached its peak in the last 12 months before The Collor Plan, in 
March 1990, when it soared to almost 6,000%. The smallest annual rate occurred in 1998, 
1.67%, the year just before the collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime due to a speculative 
attack against the Real, and by 2001 inflation had increased to 8%.  
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The Real Plan, which finally defeated the chronic high inflation that was the major feature of 
the Brazilian economy until 1994, was actually the last one following five failed attempts to 
stabilise the economy between 1986 and 1991. The effects of those plans can be clearly seen 
in Graph 5. Many of them included heterodox measures such as price controls, intervention in 
private contracts and even asset confiscation, adding extra uncertainty to the macroeconomic 
outlook. High inflation also meant institutional instability as, for example, it was the major 
factor behind changes of central bank governors and finance ministers. Those institutional 
“side effects”, together with the higher inflation uncertainty brought by both high and variable 
inflation rates, should provide some, yet very limited, idea of the endemic inflation 
uncertainty environment was the hallmark of the Brazilian economy during decades, and that 
imposed great costs on the economy. Many deep rooted macroeconomic concepts like money 
super neutrality seem very odd in this type of world. For example, it is really hard to believe 
that, say, a 50% annual inflation rate economy is as efficient in allocating its resources as a 
2% inflation rate economy. 
 
As mentioned earlier, an important cost of inflation uncertainty lies in the functioning of 
credit markets. Graphs 6 and 7 show clear-cut evidence that inflation uncertainty has been a 
major deterrent to the development of credit markets in Brazil. Graph 6 reveals clearly that in 
periods of high inflation and/or high inflation uncertainty economic agents tend not to carry 
nominal bonds, since they can incur in big losses should inflation happens to be higher than 
anticipated. This phenomenon is particularly clear during the 1984–1989 period, when 
                                                 
31 Consumer Price Index – Domestic Supply (CPI-DI). Until 1990 the CPI-DI measured inflation from 
the city of Rio de Janeiro only. From 1990 until 2001 it reflected inflation from both Rio de Janeiro and 
São Paulo cities. From 2001 until March 2006 it became a national index encompassing 12 capital 
cities. However, since then there has been a step backwards and now it encompasses 7 capital cities. 
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inflation increased very fast and three failed stabilisation plans were implemented. Note that 
from the beginning of 1987 until the end of 1989 the share of nominal bonds dropped to zero. 
During that period inflation increased from 64% in 1986 to 1759% in 1989, and even 
predicting one-month ahead inflation became a risk business. 
 
Graph 6 also shows that there is usually an increase in that share as inflation falls following 
stabilisation plans and uncertainty is reduced. Note that the steep decrease in nominal bonds 
share during the second half of 1998, when inflation was very low, is closely linked to fears 
of a sharp rise in interest rates to defend the exchange rate regime than to a more uncertain 
inflation outlook, although both events are clearly related. This fear was particularly high 
since the Central Bank had more than doubled the interest rate in October 1997 (from 19% to 
46%) to defend the currency against a speculative attack following the Asian crisis. Indeed, 
the share of nominal bonds began to decrease as early as June 1998 and in September the 
Central Bank was forced to double the interest rate once again (from 19% to 40%) to defend 
the Real against a second speculative attack following the Russian default in August. In 
January 1999 the fixed exchange rate regime finally collapsed, and since then the share of 
nominal bonds has never recovered its previous levels. Indeed, even though the Government 
adopted an inflation targeting regime as early as June 1999, the higher inflation uncertainty 
brought by the floating exchange rate regime has not been offset. 
 
Graph 6 
Nominal Bonds Share in Public Bonds Stock 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
19
70
 0
1
19
72
 0
1
19
74
 0
1
19
76
 0
1
19
78
 0
1
19
80
 0
1
19
82
 0
1
19
84
 0
1
19
86
 0
1
19
88
 0
1
19
90
 0
1
19
92
 0
1
19
94
 0
1
19
96
 0
1
19
98
 0
1
20
00
 0
1
20
02
 0
1
20
04
 0
1
 
 
The share of nominal bonds portrays a limited picture of how well a given credit market is 
functioning, the other part is given by the maturity of that debt. A high proportion of nominal 
bonds but with a low average maturity shows that the credit market is not allocating resources 
efficiently, as it would do in a more stable outlook, since long term finance is absent. Inflation 
uncertainty reduces both the share of nominal bonds in agents’ portfolios and its duration. 
Graph 7 shows another dismal picture of the Brazilian public bonds market. Two features 
should be highlighted: first, and obviously, the shocking low maturity attached to the National 
Treasury Notes (LTN), the main nominal (zero coupon) bond issued by the Brazilian 
Treasury. From July 1996 onwards the average maturity of those notes has been around four 
months. Second, unfortunately this data are only available from mid-1996 onwards, but since 
this refers to the post-stabilisation period in which inflation was very low historically, it 
suggests not only that the average maturity during the high inflation period was much lower, 
but also that even though inflation has been low in recent years agents have a very long 
inflation memory, a finding which has already been found for other countries (e.g. Gagnon, 
1997). It certainly will require a long period of low and stable inflation before inflation 
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uncertainty drops significantly, longer maturities of nominal bonds become desirable and both 
the public and private credit markets are able to work efficiently in Brazil. 
 
One could correctly point out that the low maturity attached to public bonds could reflect a 
perceived default risk. However, Graph 7 also shows the duration of the main real bond 
issued by the Brazilian Treasury: the LFTs, which are bonds indexed to the overnight interest 
rate. Although also very low, their duration is much higher than that of nominal bonds. 
Therefore, the low duration of nominal public bonds in Brazil mainly reflects the inflation 
uncertainty risk agents face, rather than political and/or regime change uncertainties. The 
situation in the private credit market is pretty much the same, although no formal evidence is 
presented here. 
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Note that one does not need rates as high as those shown in Graph 5 to take the harmful 
effects of inflation uncertainty seriously. As the U.S. experience during the 1970s and 1980s 
has shown, even annual inflation rates around 10% or lower can entail large and persistent 
forecast errors with significant economic costs. Moreover, even well into the 1990s King 
(2002) provides revealing evidence of a significant drop in the inflation risk premium on the 
announcement of the Bank of England independence, in 1997. Graphs 6 and 7, together with 
the qualitative evidence presented below regarding recent inflation forecast errors in Brazil, 
support not only this assessment but also the early findings of the Livingstone and other 
surveys during the 1970s and 1980s, corroborating their reliability despite earlier criticisms. 
 
Graph 8 shows quarterly figures for the IPCA annual inflation rate and the associated one-
year ahead Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) Inflation Report forecasts made from June 1999, 
when the first inflation report was published jointly with the implementation of the inflation 
targeting framework, until December 2003.32 As one can see one-year ahead inflation 
forecasts were well off track during that period.33 Systematic forecasting errors were 
committed, with inflation being underpredicted during most of the time. A particular dismal 
result concerns the behaviour of forecasts for the 2002.3–2003.3 period, when inflation rose 
                                                 
32 The IPCA, which has been chosen as the official inflation target index for Brazil, stands for Broad 
Consumer Price Index. 
33 Note that Graph 8 shows actual inflation and the associated forecast for that date (i.e. forecasts are 
not shown according to the date when they were made but rather according to the period they refer). 
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sharply reflecting the large currency depreciation that happened in 2002, as it became clear 
that the leftist candidate would be elected president. The graph strongly suggests that the 
increase was completely unexpected, with forecasts reacting to the actual inflation rise rather 
than anticipating it. 
 
Another revealing way of seeing that performance is by analysing what Nordhaus (1987) 
called fixed-event forecasts, where successive forecasts regarding the same terminal event (i.e. 
a forecast for a specific or terminal date) are ordered chronologically. Graph 9 shows 
nineteen series of such forecasts, in which the terminal event is inflation over the next 4 
quarters when measured in relation to the first forecasting date.34 As can be seen, a very clear 
pattern emerges: forecasts were systematically revised upwards during the four and a half 
years analysed. No formal test is needed to conclude that this picture is in sharp contrast with 
the rational expectations paradigm. 
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In its turn, Graph 10 shows the BCB Inflation Report average inflation forecast errors as the 
forecast horizon grows from one-quarter ahead to six-quarter ahead, computed from forecasts 
made between 1999.2 and 2004.2.35 Forecast horizons are labelled as t+i, for 6,,1K=i , and 
the associated forecasts are given by Et[(Pt+i – Pt)/Pt], which are compared to the accumulated 
inflation over the same period. As one can see, forecast errors increase monotonically with 
the forecast horizon in that particular sample. The size of average errors is particularly 
worrisome, mainly at those horizons relevant to monetary policy. Moreover, the poor 
performance took place in a relatively low inflation environment. 
                                                 
34 For example, consider, say, the seventh "column” in the graph, which is dated (end of) December 
2000. At that that date the first fixed-event forecast was made aiming at predicting inflation over the 
next four quarters (i.e. the year 2000 inflation rate is the terminal event to be forecast), hence the t-4 
mark on the r.h.s. axis. Then, remaining in the same column, in March 2000 a new forecast for the year 
2000 inflation was made, but now the forecast horizon had shrunk to three-quarter ahead, since the first 
quarter inflation was already known to the forecaster (hence t-3 on the r.h.s. axis). Subsequently, in 
June 2000 and September 2000 new forecasts for the year 2000 inflation were made, now with only 
two (t-2) and one quarter (t-1) ahead to go, respectively.  Therefore, Graph 9 shows 19 streams of such 
fixed events forecasts. 
35 The number of forecasts for each horizon beginning with the shortest is: 20, 19, 18, 17, 15, 12, 
respectively. 
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Graph 9 
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Graph 10 
BCB Inflation Report Average Inflation 
Forecast Errors at Several Horizons (1999.2 – 2004.2)36 
-6.00%
-5.00%
-4.00%
-3.00%
-2.00%
-1.00%
0.00%
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6
 
 
One would obviously be very interested in knowing whether private forecasts show the same 
performance as BCB forecasts. Together with the implementation of the inflation targeting 
framework in June 1999 the BCB set up a very refined survey of market expectations, whose 
results are released every week to the press and investors in the so-called Focus Report.37 The 
Focus is a unique survey of expectations since it collects real time (daily) expectations of 
many economic variables including the inflation rate.38 The public surveyed have all the 
incentives to forecast inflation accurately, since it is basically composed by several domestic 
economic consultancy firms (which one of the main jobs is to provide forecasts) and financial 
institutions, including both domestic and foreign banks with branches in Brazil. Moreover, 
                                                 
36 Note that forecast errors in the survey literature are often defined as the forecast less the outcome, so 
that negative errors mean under-prediction and positive errors mean over-prediction. 
37 Therefore, from now onwards it will be referred as the Focus Survey. 
38 For details about the Focus Survey see Marques et al. (2003). 
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even though participants’ forecasts are kept anonymous, based on the recent performance of 
individual forecasts the Central Bank of Brazil releases periodically the Top-5 best short, 
medium and long run forecasters, which gives an extra incentive to agents to do their best 
when forecasting and boost their reputation. 
 
Note that Graph 8 also plots quarterly one-year ahead median Focus forecasts, although they 
begin a little bit later than the BCB forecasts.39 There one can see that market expectations 
show pretty much the same behaviour as BCB Inflation Report forecasts, even though they 
have been a little bit “more pessimistic” throughout. Indeed, the similarity is so striking that it 
suggests forecasters have probably anchored their expectations on BCB forecasts and then 
made some small adjustments on them. In its turn Graph 11 plots monthly data on annual 
IPCA inflation and monthly 12-month ahead Focus median inflation forecasts since 
November 2001.40 Graph 11 also compares the Focus forecasts with those generated by two 
simple purely backward looking mechanisms. The first one (equation 4) is the traditional 
adaptive expectation mechanism: 
 
11,11,12 9.0 −−++ −= ttttt ee εππ  (4) 
 
where ( )[ ]tttttt PPPEe −= ++ 12,12π , 11,111 −−+− −= te ttt ππε  and πt is IPCA inflation in the last 12 
months ending in t.41 The second mechanism (equation 5) assumes an “adjusting” random 
walk in the following way: 
 ( )12412,12 2.0 ttttte ππππ −+=+  (5) 
 
where ( )[ ] hhthttht PPP 12−−−=π  is the h-period inflation at time t reported at an annual rate. 
That is, expected inflation over the next 12 months equals the current annual inflation plus a 
correcting term given by the difference between the current quarterly inflation expressed at an 
annual rate minus the current annual inflation. The rationale for this extra term is to pick up 
more quickly increases or decreases in trend inflation, since as in equation (4) one is dealing 
with overlapping forecasts (i.e. forecasts are made on a quarterly basis but the event to be 
forecast is inflation for the next 12 months). The forecasts generated by this mechanism are 
labelled as naïve forecasts. 
 
Table 1 
Accuracy Statistics (2000.11 – 2004.9)42 
 Bias MSE 
Focus -3.44% 0.34% 
Adaptive 0.04% 0.43% 
Naïve 0.01% 0.40% 
 
As Table 1 shows, these two purely mechanical backward looking mechanisms beat easily the 
Focus forecasts when the performance criterion used is the bias and are just a little bit worse 
when the criterion used is the mean squared error. This result is very disturbing from a 
rational expectation perspective and makes it very clear that the absence of bias is not a very 
meaningful proof that forecasts are “rational” as it is widely assumed in the literature, a result 
that Graph 2 had already shown. Indeed, both the adaptive and naïve forecasts have no bias 
                                                 
39 To obtain the first four quarterly one-year ahead Focus expectations in Graph 8, linear interpolation 
was used to get forecasts for some specific months.  
40 The forecasts are from the last working day of each month. 
41 The first forecast is assumed to be equal to the last 12-month inflation. 
42 The first forecast was assumed to be equal to actual inflation (i.e. zero forecast error). Since there are 
34 forecasts, this assumption does not make much difference. 
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over this particular sample. Both Graphs 8 and 11 show that expected inflation turning points 
lag behind actual inflation turning points, a feature widely found in practice (see Thomas Jr. 
(1999) for the U.S. evidence).43 Note that the Focus and the naïve forecasts start to increase at 
about the same time suggesting that actual forecasts have a large backward looking 
component, reacting rather than anticipating future inflation. As mentioned before, this 
evidence has also been widely found elsewhere. Indeed, all three forecasts have a remarkably 
similar pattern until the last quarter of 2002, even though the Focus forecasts are much less 
accurate during this period.44 After that they start to diverge and the Focus forecasts perform 
better, since they increased less and started to decline earlier than the other two types of 
forecasts. The market did not believe that inflation would continue rising for much longer, 
while the two mechanical simulated forecasts needed some time to “recognise” that. 
 
Graph 11 
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Graph 12 shows four long monthly streams of fixed-event inflation forecasts, but now 
constructed from the Focus Survey, in which the terminal events are calendar year IPCA 
inflation rates for the years 2001–2004. The horizontal lines indicate the actual annual 
inflation rates for each year. Once again it is very clear the large errors private forecasters 
committed in predicting inflation during that period. Moreover, a striking feature of those 
forecasts is the sluggishness with which forecasters recognised that their forecasts were well 
off track. Usually, it was not until a little bit before mid-year of the forecast year, and 
sometimes even later, as in 2002, that forecasters became really aware that their forecasts 
were badly wrong for that year. This is worrisome, since it shows that the ability to predict 
inflation more than two quarters in advance seems to be very low in Brazil. 
 
The significant forecast errors of private forecasters calls into question key issues about 
central banking and monetary policy such as: a) the convergence of private forecasts to either 
inflation targets or central bank’s forecasts is not necessarily meaningful regarding the 
appropriateness of the monetary policy stance; b) consequently, it could be potentially 
dangerous for central banks to put much weight on inflation surveys to set monetary policy. 
This is particularly relevant when private forecasts have the central bank’s forecasts as their 
                                                 
43 Note that since forecasts are from the last working day of the month it is assumed that the forecaster 
knows the actual inflation rate for that month. This is a sensible assumption in the Brazilian context, 
since IPCA inflation is calculated every two weeks, so that by the end of the month the forecaster 
already knows its partial estimate (i.e. the forecast for that month is actually a 15-day forecast). 
44 Note that forecasts are dated one year earlier in relation to the actual outcomes shown in the graph. 
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benchmark, creating a phenomenon of circular causation;45 c) This calls into attention that 
focusing on forecast dispersion may be as important as the actual “consensus” rate to assess 
the expected economic outlook. The recent history of inflation forecast errors in Brazil is 
particularly troublesome since they took place after inflation had been drastically reduced 
following the Real Plan in 1994. With the exception of 2002, when annual IPCA inflation 
reached 12.53%, calendar year inflation has been lower than 10% since 1996. It also provides 
a hint of the huge inflation uncertainty that existed during the high inflation era. Moreover, on 
historical grounds political and policy uncertainties have been at very low levels, mainly after 
1999.46 In this regard, note that inflation has been chronically underpredicted, a result which 
is just the opposite of what one would expect in the case of inflation uncertainty being heavily 
influenced by policy or political uncertainty (i.e. the peso problem). 
 
Graph 12 
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Against the above background it should not be hard to figure out that inflation uncertainty has 
been both pervasive and harmful to the Brazilian economy. Moreover, although inflation 
uncertainty has certainly decreased since the stabilisation of the economy, it is still pretty 
much present clouding the decision-making process and impairing economic efficiency. 
Given the chaotic Brazilian inflationary history, it will certainly require a long period of low 
and stable inflation until inflation uncertainty drops to acceptable levels, especially long run 
uncertainty, and resources can be efficiently allocated. 
 
 
                                                 
45 The dangers of relying on private forecasts were raised by Poole (2001) within the context of high 
credibility central banks. Poole argues that when a central bank has high credibility the market can put 
too much weight on its forecasts, and hence the central bank can be misled if it puts too much weight 
on market expectations. 
46 Apart from the year 2002, when there were concerns about the likely consequences of a leftist win in 
the presidential election. However, after the new government took office it very soon became clear that 
the economic policy would continue to be soundly based. 
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6 – Estimating Inflation Uncertainty for Brazil 
 
 
It is a big understatement to say that, due to its latent nature, inflation uncertainty is a difficult 
variable to measure. The difficulties go much beyond that, since uncertainty is a subjective 
concept. Its measurement faces several peculiar challenges, beginning with the absence of a 
representative agent in practice. The evidence shows that agents’ views about how the 
economy works and its future prospects differ widely. This heterogeneity is reflected in the 
wide variation of forecasts collected by surveys (i.e. disagreement). Worse, there is some 
disturbing evidence suggesting that some agents have expectations that are not even 
correlated with structural determinants of inflation (Brischetto and Brower, 1999). Also, there 
are a plethora of models and techniques available, with different degrees of sophistication, to 
predict inflation, making inflation uncertainty measurement highly model dependent. 
Moreover, usual econometric proxies capture only one dimension of uncertainty, since they 
are based on ex-post errors. Ex-ante uncertainty, which could be understood (but not limited 
to) as the dispersion of the underlying probability distribution is theoretically closer to the 
concept of uncertainty. Finally, one key challenge if one wants to get reliable proxies of 
actual inflation uncertainty is (trying) to replicate the economic environment forecasters faced 
at each point in time when out-of-sample forecasts were being made. This temporal restriction 
obviously excludes any measure derived from in-sample residuals, which are nonetheless the 
dominant practice in the inflation uncertainty literature. 
 
Not so obviously, it also puts under suspicion “out-of-sample” forecasts based on 
specifications which were originally derived using the whole sample (i.e. future information). 
This could lead to inconsistencies due to two related problems: first, in principle only one 
specification will be used to make those (pseudo) out-of-sample forecasts. Moreover, an ever-
changing economy could ask for different forecasting models at different points in time. 
Second, the inclusion or exclusion of a given variable in the final specification can be 
influenced by the use of future information. For example, it is a well-known fact that the 
(supposedly) stable relation between narrow money and nominal GDP broke during the 1980s 
in several countries. Therefore, when one estimates a “forecasting” model, say, for the 1970–
2000 period, it might happen that money is left out of the final specification since it becomes 
insignificant in the second half of the sample, decreasing its overall significance. This 
specification would clearly be historically inconsistent since money was an obligatory 
variable in multivariate inflation forecasting equations until the mid-1980s. Therefore, despite 
being very time consuming, the methodological advantages of using just historical available 
data when generating simulation forecasts should be evident. Out-of-sample temporally 
consistent forecasts have two crucial additional advantages: they do not impose the restriction 
embedded in in-sample forecasts that forecast errors should average zero, and they do not 
imply that autocorrelated errors are the result of mis-specified models. As the evidence 
presented so far has shown, both “violations” are widely found in surveys. The use of 
historical available data also deals to some extent with parameter uncertainty, since 
coefficients are not considered to be constant throughout the sample.  
 
It remains open, however, the difficult issue of what information set agents have actually used 
and how complex should be the forecasting model. Fortunately, these issues need not be a 
serious problem, since the use of univariate models deals to a great extent with them. Indeed, 
the univariate framework has some important methodological advantages in this context. The 
first is obviously its simplicity, which means that there is a higher probability that univariate 
forecast errors will be representative of forecasts errors made in practice.47 Second, although 
                                                 
47 Although some agents certainly use more sophisticated models to predict inflation, there is no doubt 
that simplicity is a desired feature when one chooses a method for estimating and/or forecasting. For 
example, although conceptually flawed as a measure of the output gap, many economists use the HP 
filter to derive a series of output gaps. Moreover, there is much evidence that many agents use very 
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a-theoretical, univariate inflation forecasts have proved to be a very though benchmark to 
beat. For example, in their extensive forecasting exercise on U.S. inflation Stock and Watson 
(1999) concluded that “in many situations [univariate models] have proven to be surprisingly 
strong benchmarks”. Canova (2002) finds for the G-7 economies that “bivariate and trivariate 
models suggested by economic theory or statistical analysis are hardly better than univariate 
models”. Among those models is the very popular Phillips curve. He notes that “the 
information contained in the dynamics of past inflation suffices to predict future inflation and 
very few other variables add marginal predictive content to univariate specifications.” Finally, 
using a univariate framework guarantees that the information set used is temporally 
consistent, since agents surely know, and take into account, the history of inflation when 
making inflation forecasts. 
 
Therefore, 112 univariate forecasting models, one for each quarter from 1974.1 until 2001.4, 
were estimated in order to generate simulated real time inflation uncertainty proxies for 
Brazil.48 Two forecasting horizons will be analysed in more detail: one-quarter ahead (i.e. 
one-step ahead), 1ln +Δ tt PE , which is the most common horizon focused in the forecasting 
literature, and one-year ahead, 44 ln +Δ tt PE , which is also becoming very popular and is a 
central horizon in the survey literature. Moreover, one year ahead forecasts should also give 
an idea of medium-term uncertainty. A summary of the entire set of estimated models is 
placed in Appendix 1. However, it is useful to summarize the main findings of this 
forecasting exercise. First, and not surprisingly, it was an enormous challenge to find 
reasonable inflation forecasting models for Brazil, especially concerning their stability 
properties. Very few other countries have experienced such “rich” inflation dynamics: 
Brazilian inflation has not only reached and sustained very high levels for several years but it 
also experienced some spells of hyperinflation, when inflation was clearly an explosive 
process. As a result inflation shows extreme volatility over the period analysed and faced 
several structural breaks due to several stabilisation plans. Indeed, the main problem during 
estimation was caused by those breaks during the 1986–1994 period. Whenever they can, 
economists choose to avoid such periods by beginning estimation after they occurred but here 
there is no such option, since people have to continue making forecasts in turbulent times as 
well, whether or not they are able to come up with well specified models.  
 
Consequently, forecasting models varied greatly over time, which means that there is no 
unique model that fits the entire data, at least using an univariate approach. This is expected, 
since there was more than one inflation regime during the sample. Models differed in three 
main aspects: a) given the very different dynamic of inflation over the sample and the 
occurrence of several structural breaks, models were estimated using different sub-samples in 
order to improve their stability. Table 2 shows the different sub-samples used and the date of 
the first model estimated within each sample; b) the contribution of different lags of inflation 
as well as the degree of inflation persistency varied across models; c) even using shorter 
samples the following transformation of the inflation: 400πt/(1+4πt), where πt = ΔlnPt, was 
needed to decrease inflation variability for the models estimated between 1989.4 and 1994.2, 
when inflation was clearly an explosive process. This transformation constrains inflation to be 
less than 100%, reduced its persistency and produced more accurate forecasts.49 The 
estimated models required several intervention variables to cope with the effects of 
stabilisation plans and other economic shocks such as oil shocks and large discrete exchange 
rate devaluations. Therefore, the large number of dummies used has clear theoretical 
justification, although a few of them are not related to any economic event in an obviously 
                                                                                                                                            
simple methods when forecasting, such as extrapolation, rules of thumb, etc. 
48 Note that in each quarter a new model is estimated using only information available up to that 
quarter, as if agents were predicting inflation in real time. 
49 Even so, there were signs of a shift in the magnitude of lagged inflation coefficients after 1986, when 
the first stabilisation plan was implemented. However, recursive Chows tests did not indicate clear 
structural breaks in the models. 
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manner. Overall the models passed in all specification tests: only 9 out of 112 models have 
some diagnostic tests significant at 5% or lower (see Appendix 1). Four of them are in the 
1987.3–1988.3 period, following the adoption of two stabilisation plans in 1986 and 1987, 
and before the 1989 stabilisation plan. Most problems were reflected in significant normality 
or heteroscedasticity tests, and were expected given the high volatility of inflation. 
  
Table 2 
Forecasting Inflation in Brazil: Simulation Results 
Estimation50  Degree of Difficulty51 
Sub-Samples First Model   Period 
1963.1–1986.2 1974.1  “Easy” 1974.1–1986.2 
1976.1–1987.2 1986.3  Difficult 1986.3–1988.1 
1979.3–1993.2 1987.3  Very Difficult 1988.2–1994.2 
1986.4–1994.2 1993.3  “Tricky” 1994.3–2001.4 
1987.4–2000.4 1994.3    
1990.3–2001.4 2001.1    
 
Table 2 also shows that the sample can be divided into four periods, according to the 
difficulty in modelling and/or forecasting. The first period, called the “easy” period begins in 
1974.1 and goes until 1986.2, the quarter after the first stabilisation plan was put in place. 
Although during this period the economy was hit by two oil shocks and faced two large 
exchange rate devaluations (33% in December 1979 and 39% in February 1983) it was 
relatively easy to get models with stable parameters and no structural breaks. However, as of 
1986.3, just four months after the first stabilisation plan was implemented, the models’ 
quality begins to deteriorate fast, and the use of different (and shorter) samples helped in 
improving models’ adequacy. Therefore, the 1986.3–1988.1 period is classified as difficult. 
This period can be seen as a transition period to an even more difficult period, the period from 
1988.2 until 1994.1, which encompasses three stabilisation plans and ends just before the 
implementation of The Real Plan. During this period inflation is clearly an explosive process 
and using the transformation mentioned above helped a lot in getting better forecasts. Finally, 
models estimated from 1994.3 onwards (i.e. after the Real Plan) produced surprisingly stable 
coefficients and usually did not have any problems in passing the diagnostic tests. However, 
this apparently easiness is misleading, since: a) put into an historical perspective many 
apparently well specified models produced forecasts that were clearly unrealistic (either too 
high or too low). This is probably because the coefficients were estimated using a sample that 
includes the very high inflation period, so parameters estimates were “contaminated” by the 
previous regime; b) often similar specifications produced very different forecasts, so they 
were not as reliable as one would like. Although from a pure theoretical viewpoint this is 
undesirable, this fact just highlights both model uncertainty and the importance of judgment 
in choosing between models that forecasters face in practice; c) in the following five quarters 
after the adoption of The Real Plan, in July 1994, and the sharp decrease in inflation rates that 
ensued, models were not able to produce sensible forecasts. Therefore, in three quarters (see 
Appendix 1) forecasts were made assuming a random walk model, which produced much 
smaller forecast errors. Hence, the 1994.3–2002.1 period is called the “tricky” period. 
                                                 
50 The column “First Model” indicates the first model estimated within a specific sub-sample, For 
example, the first model estimated in the first sub-sample (1963.1–1986.2) was in 1974.1 using data 
from the 1963.1–1974.1 period. The next model, estimated in 1974.2, uses data from the 1963.1–
1974.2 period and so on, until 1986.2, when the sub-sample changes for the first time. In the second 
sub-sample (1976.1–1987.2) the first model is estimated in 1986.3 using data from the 1976.1–1986.3 
period, and so on like before. 
51 The estimation sample for each model is shown in the first two columns of this table. For example, 
the first model estimated in the “easy” period is in 1974.1, which uses data from the 1963.1–1974.1 
period. The last model in the difficult period was estimated in 1988.1, using data from the 1979.3–
1988.1 period. 
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Graph 14 
Quarterly CPI Inflation and One-Quarter Ahead 
Simulated Out-of-Sample Forecasts (1975.1–2002.1) 
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Graph 15 
Quarterly CPI Inflation and One-Quarter Ahead 
Simulated Out-of-Sample Forecasts (1995.2–2002.1) 
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Graph 14 shows the resulting series of one-quarter ahead simulated forecasts (Et-1πt) 
compared to actual quarterly outcomes (πt), where πt = ΔlnPt. The graph also plots the 
associated forecast errors (πt – Et-1πt). Note that since inflation reached very high levels in the 
middle of the sample those rates overshadow the low inflation period, after 1994. Therefore 
Graph 15 shows the results from 1995.2 onwards. Note also that the forecasts made during the 
1989.4–1994.2 period, which were based on the 400πt/(1+4πt) transformation, were converted 
back to their original units so that the forecast series is homogenous throughout the sample. 
The findings listed in Table 2 are clearly reflected in these graphs. Until 1985 forecasts follow 
actual inflation closely despite some consistent underprediction, mainly after 1979 when 
inflation increases rapidly following the second oil shock. This is the “easy” forecasting 
period. From 1986 until 1994, when inflation increases very fast and reaches very high levels 
forcing the adoption of several stabilisation plans, forecast errors become very large, even for 
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just one-quarter ahead forecasts. This is the chaotic inflationary period, in which forecasting 
was extremely difficult. In the last period, after 1994, when stabilisation finally succeeds, one 
quarter ahead forecast show the smallest errors in the sample, as Graph 15 shows. However, 
note that this is to be expected since inflation rates are very low compared to other periods, 
and should not be understood as an easy forecasting period, as the evidence put forward in 
last section clearly shows. 
 
Graph 16 
Annual CPI Inflation and One-Year Ahead  
Simulated Out-of-Sample Forecasts (1975.1–2002.1) 
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Graph 17 
Annual CPI Inflation and One-Year Ahead 
Simulated Out-of-Sample Forecasts (1995.4–2002.1) 
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In their turn, Graphs 16 and 17 show how one-year ahead simulated forecasts ( ( )tt PE ln44 Δ− ) 
performed compared to actual annual inflation ( tPln4Δ ). The resulting forecast errors 
( ( )tttt PEP lnln 444 Δ−Δ= −ε ) show an even clearer picture of the facts already portrayed by 
Graphs 14 and 15. Note that: a) there is a sharp deterioration in forecast accuracy at longer 
horizons. One-year ahead forecast errors are substantially larger than one-quarter ahead, even 
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disregarding errors due to stabilisation plans’ effects;52 b) these forecasts remind those from 
surveys, which usually show consistent underprediction when inflation is rising and 
consistent overprediciton when it is falling. Graphs 14 and 16 show clearly that uncertainty 
increases with the inflation level. This evidence can be seen in more detail in Graph 1 in 
Appendix 2, which shows the cross-plot between one-quarter to one-year ahead absolute 
forecast errors and inflation over the same time horizon. 
 
Graph 18 shows the simulated average out-of-sample forecast errors from both one-quarter 
and one-year ahead forecasts.53 Note that in opposition to traditional recursive errors, which 
come from a single specification, in this case a new forecasting model is fitted at each quarter. 
Note also that forecast errors are defined as being the forecast less the outcome, so that 
negative errors intuitively mean under prediction and positive errors over prediction. As it can 
be seen, one-step ahead forecasts do not show bias when the whole sample is considered. 
However, as argued before, this feature might not be very meaningful about the quality of the 
forecasts. Indeed, a closer look reveals that inflation was often underestimated during the 
whole period, and indeed forecast bias was present until 1994. Even so, overall the forecasts 
seem to be very good, as suggested by Graph 14: the bias seems relatively small until 1986, 
increasing after that partially because of the stabilisation plans effects, and decreasing sharply 
after 1994.54 However, the picture conveyed by the one-year ahead forecast errors is not so 
optimistic: there are large and persistent errors. 
 
Graph 18 
Average Out-of-Sample Forecast Errors (1975.1–2001.4)55 
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The evidence presented here and elsewhere is unequivocal: a) the zero-mean error restriction 
embedded in in-sample inflation “forecasts” often does not hold in practice, mainly for longer 
term forecasts; b) forecast errors are usually persistent; c) agents react rather than anticipate 
turning points; Hence, the evidence highlights the large difference between modelling and 
                                                 
52 Note that even if agents know when there will be a regime change, it remains a challenge to forecast 
the new inflation path accurately. See da Silva Filho (2006) for some evidence on the Real Plan period 
using OECD forecasts. 
53 The first observation in both series is given by the average of the first 13 forecast errors. The large 
swings in the one-year ahead average errors are due to the implementation of stabilisation plans, when 
inflation is hugely overpredicted, largely offsetting the previous bias.  
54 One should be reminded that inflation is derived from logarithmic numbers so forecast errors 
magnitudes are underestimated. 
55 Note that here forecasts are dated by the date at which they were made, and not by the date of their 
realisation. 
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forecasting, a difference that economists usually do not take properly into account. 
Consequently, in-sample “forecasts” cannot be taken as a reliable proxy of real life out-of-
sample forecasts. Moreover, the role of uncertainty in economic decisions is clearly 
underestimated when one analyses short-run measures, such as one-quarter ahead forecast 
errors. This horizon gives a misleading picture of our real ability to forecast accurately on 
horizons likely to be more relevant for most economic decisions. Finally, note that in the 
simulation above even though forecasts are biased and persistent errors are being committed, 
overall forecasts come from apparently well-specified models. 
 
Graph 19 
One-Quarter Ahead Univariate and Random Walk Forecast Errors 
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Graph 20 
Four-Quarter Ahead Univariate and Random Walk Forecast Errors 
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Graph 19 plots the univariate one-quarter ahead out-of-sample forecast errors obtained above 
and those derived from a random walk model (i.e. last quarter’s inflation rate is the forecast 
for the next quarter inflation rate). Note that they are very similar, suggesting that even at 
one-quarter ahead Brazilian inflation has been largely unpredictable. Indeed, both types of 
errors have a correlation coefficient equal to 0.81, and Graph 2 in Appendix 2 shows that 
correlation explicitly. This makes sense given the history of high and unstable inflation in 
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Brazil. It implies that, at least in the Brazilian case, inflation uncertainty proxies derived from 
a simple random walk model of inflation should provide reliable inflation uncertainty 
proxies.56 Graph 19 also highlights the very large forecast errors made during the 1986–1994 
period. This is certainly unusual for one-quarter ahead forecasts, but it should not come as a 
surprise since inflation was clearly out of control during that period and several stabilisation 
plans were adopted during that time. Indeed, this period overshadows the rest of sample 
giving the false impression that errors in other periods were small. Graph 20 shows the same 
exercise for one-year ahead forecasts. The picture remains largely same, although one can see 
some divergence between both series during the 1988–1989 period. Also, now forecast errors 
are relatively larger in the first third of the sample. 
 
Finally, Table 3 compares the forecasting performance between the two types of forecasts in 
four different horizons. Note that 1Q refers to inflation forecasts for the next quarter 
( tt PE ln1Δ− ), 2Q refers to forecasts for inflation over the next two quarters ( tt PE ln22Δ− ), 3Q 
over the next three quarters ( tt PE ln33Δ− ) and 4Q over the next four quarters ( tt PE ln44Δ− ). 
The associated random walk forecast is given by the most recent inflation rate for the same 
period involved in the forecast. For example, the random walk forecast for inflation over the 
next three quarters is the accumulated inflation in the last two quarters plus the current 
quarter. 
 
Table 3 
Brazilian Inflation (1975.1–2002.1): 
Univariate and Random Walk Forecast Performance 
 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 
 BIAS 
Univariate -0.03% 0.95% 2.91% 4.94% 
Random Walk -0.03% -0.15% -0.46% 0.67% 
 Relative RMSE57 
 0.82 0.90 0.92 0.88 
 Qualitative Performance 
Univariate 62 54 55 56 
Random Walk 47 55 54 53 
 
As it was found when both the BCB Inflation Report and Focus forecasts were analysed in 
Section 5, forecasts from random walks show very low bias. Here, apart from the first 
forecast horizon, they win in every other horizon, and prove once again to be extremely 
difficult to beat in this criterion. When it comes to the relative root mean square errors the 
situation is inverted. Now, for each horizon univariate forecasts beat random walk forecasts, 
mainly in one-quarter ahead forecasts. Notice, however, that because of the big errors due to 
stabilisation plans effects this ordering could be distorted by a few outliers. Therefore, it is 
also useful to analyse the relative qualitative aspect of each type of forecast, expressed by the 
number of times that each series is closer than the other, in absolute value, to the actual 
outcome. The bottom part of Table 3 shows a clear superiority of univariate forecasts over 
random walks when the next quarter inflation is considered, but a very similar performance in 
the remaining horizons. 
                                                 
56 Brunner and Hess (1993) found evidence that changes in inflation are more relevant in explaining 
inflation uncertainty in their model than forecast errors. Crawford and Kasumovich (1996) mentioned  
that research at the Bank of Canada found that although one-year ahead forecast errors from a 
Canadian survey were related to inflation level they were more related to changes in inflation. 
57 Defined as the ratio between univariate RMSE and random walk RMSE.  
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7 – Conclusion 
 
 
Forecasting is an art, and a very difficult one, especially when one lives in a non-stationary 
world that is subject to frequent structural breaks. The recurrent episodes of forecast failure 
observed in practice make those difficulties very clear. They are more clearly connected to 
turbulent times such as the 1970s (e.g. the failure of the big macro models in the U.S.). 
Indeed, as Hendry (2000a) points out that “… periods of forecast failures and economic 
turbulence often go hand in glove …” However, forecast failure is also pervasive in “normal” 
times, such as the 1990s. For example, Greenspan (1999) notices that “Forecasts of inflation 
and of growth in real activity for the United States, including those of the Federal Open 
Market Committee, have been generally off for several years. Inflation has been chronically 
overpredicted and real GDP growth underpredicted.”, while Pagan (2001) points out that 
“Problems in predicting inflation have been a worldwide problem in the mid to late 1990s …”  
As a consequence, economists’ ability to forecast has often been the subject of jokes. Nothing 
could be more embarrassing to the rational expectations paradigm, which assumes that 
forecasts are accurate and no systematic errors are committed. However, when one reads the 
econometric inflation uncertainty literature one has the impression that forecasting is very 
easy. For example, even though forecasting in the 1970s was very difficult Engle (1983) 
stated that “Although the level of inflation in the seventies was high, it was predictable.” So 
what is behind Engle’s assessment? 
 
This paper has criticised the econometric inflation uncertainty proxies found in the literature, 
and highlighted the sharp contrast between the evidence portrayed by that literature and the 
survey literature. While the latter shows overwhelming evidence that inflation uncertainty is 
positively related to the inflation level, as argued by Okun (1971) and Friedman (1977), the 
former usually find no such link, as argued by Engle (1983)). So why is that literature so 
optimistic about people’s ability to forecast? This paper claims that one major factor is that 
the econometric proxies found in the literature are temporally inconsistent, since they come 
from models that use future information to derive forecasts. In other words, economists have 
surprisingly been using in-sample “forecasts” to assess inflation uncertainty. Another reason 
refers to the forecast horizon used. While the survey literature usually focus on one-year 
ahead forecasts, applied econometric papers traditionally focuses on one-quarter ahead 
forecasts, which are more accurate than longer term forecasts, giving a misleading idea about 
the difficulties forecasters are likely to face in practice. 
 
It should have been evident that if one aims at obtaining reliable proxies for the degree of 
uncertainty a forecaster faces when a forecast is being made a necessary condition is not to 
use data that was unavailable to the forecaster to that date (e.g. future data or revised data). It 
was pointed out that in-sample “forecasts” produce, by construction, zero mean average one-
step ahead forecast errors regardless of the model’s quality. Moreover, if the model is well 
specified one-step ahead in-sample “forecast” errors will be uncorrelated. Those two features 
mean that uncertainty is likely to be underestimated in such setting, and explain why in-
sample econometric forecasts look so good when compared to actual forecasts. Indeed, this 
paper has shown that empirical forecasts convey a much more cautious message about agents’ 
real ability to forecast. Surveys clearly show that expectations have a large backward looking 
component, usually reacting rather than anticipating to events, especially turning points. 
Inflation forecasts, in particular, are found to usually underestimate inflation when it is rising 
and overestimate inflation when it is falling. 
 
It comes as a surprise that inflation uncertainty, which is at the very centre of the inflation 
uncertainty-level debate, has not been receiving its due attention from economists. This odd 
situation is a testimony to the massive influence of the rational expectations paradigm in 
economics, in which words such as forecast failure and systematic errors have no room, and 
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helps to explain why economists have been deriving inflation uncertainty proxies in such a 
naïve way. The fact that economists have historically dismissed and systematically ignored 
the evidence from surveys gives support to this interpretation. As notes Carroll (2001) “… the 
bulk of the macroeconomics profession has ignored the rich empirical data available on actual 
household and business expectations in favor of the theoretical purity of rational expectations 
models.” However, surveys have passed the test of time, and have proven to be reliable. The 
evidence today is pretty much the same as that dismissed in the 1970s. Moreover, recent 
studies have shown that empirical macro models work better when instead of using model-
consistent expectations, survey expectations are used (e.g. Roberts, 1997, 1998). 
  
After having established the sharp contrast between both literatures and uncovered the 
reasons behind that discrepancy the paper analysed inflation forecasts from both the Central 
Bank of Brazil Inflation Report and the recently created Focus Survey. The evidence that 
emerged was grim: inflation has been systematically underpredicted in Brazil since 2000, and 
forecast errors have been large. At the same time several pre-established inflation targets have 
been changed upwards, harming the credibility of the inflation-targeting framework. This 
evidence has some interesting implications. For example, it shows that the Central Bank of 
Brazil should be very cautions when using private forecasts to assess the adequacy of its 
monetary policy. It perhaps also suggests that degree of disagreement among forecasters 
could be as valuable in conveying information about agents’ perceptions as the so-called 
consensus forecasts.    
 
More broadly, it was called to attention the endemic degree of inflation uncertainty observed 
historically in Brazil, and its associated costs. Clear evidence on this regard is given not only 
by the striking low average maturity attached to nominal public bonds but mainly by the 
much shorter maturity of nominal bonds relatively to real bonds. More importantly, this 
situation remains even after ten years of stabilisation has taken place, highlighting the serious 
costs of inflation uncertainty in Brazil. These hysteresis effects have also been elsewhere and 
point towards the potential large welfare gains to Brazil from a policy in which the Central 
Bank aims at keeping inflation at very low levels for extended periods of time. 
 
In the final part of the paper a forecasting simulation exercise was carried out in order to get 
out-of-sample temporally consistent inflation uncertainty proxies for Brazil. This was 
accomplished by estimating different inflation forecasting models, one for each quarter, 
during the 1975.1–2001.1 period. Although it is an impossible task to figure out what was in 
people’s minds at the time they were forecasting, the results were very interesting. For 
example, the pattern of inflation forecasts was found to be very similar to what surveys of 
expectations have been showing elsewhere: systematic underprediction when inflation is 
rising and systematic overprediction when inflation is falling. The simulation also shows that 
forecast accuracy decreases very sharply with the forecast horizon in Brazil, which helps to 
explain the very low maturity of nominal bonds. Finally, the simulated inflation forecasts 
produced very similar errors to those generated by a simple random walk model, reflecting 
the high degree of unpredictability of Brazilian inflation, and suggesting that the latter should 
provide a reliable inflation uncertainty proxy for Brazil. Interestingly, Section 4 mentioned 
evidence that in both the U.S. and Canada changes in inflation have been found to be closely 
linked to inflation uncertainty.  
 
Besides the above findings one hopes that the main message from this paper is one of 
humility. Our ability to forecast is yet very limited and one only needs some volatility for 
large forecast errors to appear. The evidence from developing countries is crucial to establish 
this result. The small magnitude and higher accuracy of inflation forecast errors observed in 
industrialized countries cannot be purely understood as an indicator of our forecasting skills, 
since they result, to a large extent, of both low and predictable inflation. In order words, when 
inflation is low and stable it becomes very difficult to make large forecast errors, and this is a 
very good reason for pursuing price stability. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Out-of-Sample Historical Estimates 
Forecast 
Date Yt ∑=3 1i iS  ∑= −6 1i itY  ∑= −Δ5 0i itY  ∑= −Δ4 0 2i itY  Dummies MST 
1974.1  1 1 1,4,6    12.4% 
1974.2  1 1 1,4,6    10.7% 
1974.3  1 1 1,4,6    33.9% 
1974.4  1 1 1,4,6    35% 
1975.1  1 1 1,4,6    20.8% 
1975.2  1 1 1,4,6    19.7% 
1975.3  1 1 1,4    8.3% 
1975.4  1 1 1,4    6.9% 
1976.1  1 1 1,4   1,3 21.1% 
1976.2  1 1 1,4   1,3 21.4% 
1976.3  1 1 1,4   1,3 23.5% 
1976.4  1 1 1,4   1,3 22.1% 
1977.1  1 1 1,4   1,3 19.7% 
1977.2  1 1 1,4   1,3 19.5% 
1977.3  1 1 1,4   1,3 18.5% 
1977.4  1 1 1,4   1,3 16.7% 
1978.1  1 1 1,4   1,3 16.2% 
1978.2  1 1 1,4   1,3 16.4% 
1978.3  1 1 1,4   1,3 14.7% 
1978.4  1 1 1,4   1,3 14.3% 
1979.1  1 1 1,4   1,3 12.7% 
1979.2  1 1 1,4   1,3 11.2% 
1979.3  1 1 1,4   1,3,4 14.9% 
1979.4  1 1 1,4   1,3,4 14.9% 
1980.1  1 1 1,3,4   2,4 10% 
1980.2  1 1 1,3,4   2,4 11.9% 
1980.3  1 1 1,3,4   2,4 13.2% 
1980.4  1 1 1,3,4   2,4 10.7% 
1981.1  1 1 1,3,4   2,4 8.1% 
1981.2  1 1 1,4   1,4 8.9% 
1981.3  1 1 1,3,4   1,2,4 14.9% 
1981.4  1 1 1,4   1,4,5 15.3% 
1982.1  1 1 1,4   1,4,5 16.5% 
1982.2  1 1 1,4   1,4,5 6.6% 
1982.3  1 1 1,3,4   1,4,5 16.3% 
1982.4  1 1 1,3,4   1,4,5 15.5% 
1983.1  1 1 1,3,4   1,4,5 20.8% 
1983.2  1 1 1,3,4   1,4,5 9.8% 
1983.3  1 1 1,3,4   1,4,5,7 9.8% 
1983.4  1 1 1,3,4   1,2,4,5,7 21.3% 
1984.1  1 1,2 1,3,5,6   4,5,6 7.4% 
1984.2  1 1,2 1,3,5,6   4,5,6 10.0% 
1984.3  1 1,2 1,3,5,6   4,5,6 15.4% 
1984.4  1 1,2 1,3,5,6   4,5,6 14.4% 
1985.1  1 1,2 1,3,5,6   4,5,6 13.1% 
1985.2  1 1 1,4   4,5,7,8 10.1% 
1985.3  1 1 1,4   1,4,5,7,8 15.0% 
1985.4  1 1 1,3,4   4,5,7,8 6.5% 
1986.1  1 1,2 1,3,4   4,8 19.3% 
1986.2  1 1 1,3,4   4,7,8,9 7.0% 
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Forecast 
Date Yt ∑=3 1i iS  ∑= −6 1i itY  ∑= −Δ5 0i itY  ∑= −Δ4 0 2i itY  Dummies MST 
1986.3  1 1 1,5   4,8,9 30.4% 
1986.4  1 1 1,5   4,8,9 30.6% 
1987.1  1 1 1,5   8,9,11 48% 
1987.2  1 2 1   5,9,11,12 10.4% 
1987.3  1 1 1,5   9,10,12 0.7%2 
1987.4  1 1 1,5   9,10,12,13 1.4%2 
1988.1  1 1 1,2,3   9,10,11,12 24.9% 
1988.2  1  1,2,3,4   9,10,11,12 1.1%3 
1988.3  1  1,2,3,4   9,10,11,12,16 1.1%3 
1988.4  1  1,2,3,4   9,10,11,12, 16 0.0%3 
1989.1  1  1,3   9,11,12,13,18 12.5% 
1989.2  1 1 1,5   9,10,12,14,15,17 30.2% 
1989.3  1 2 1,3   9,11,12,13,18,19 14.8% 
1989.4  2 1,3 1,2,5   9,14,17 44.9% 
1990.1  2 1,3 1,2,5   9,14,17 47.2% 
1990.2  2 1,3 1,2,5   9,14,17,21 49.7% 
1990.3  2 1,3 1,2,5   9,14,17,21 56.1% 
1990.4  2 1,3 1,2,5   9,14,17,21 54.9% 
1991.1  2 1,3 1,2,5   9,14,21 12.2% 
1991.2  2 1,3 1,2,5   9,14,21,22 12.2% 
1991.3  2 1,3 1,2,5   9,14,21,22 7.4% 
1991.4  2 1,3 1,2,5   9,14,21,22 18.4% 
1992.1  2 1,3 1,2,5   9,14,21,22 13.1% 
1992.2  2 1,3 1,2,5   9,14,21,22 11.8% 
1992.3  2 1,3 1,2,5   9,14,21,22 9.0% 
1992.4  2 1,3 1,2,5   9,14,21 20.7% 
1993.1  2 1,3 1,2,5   9,14,21,22 9.1% 
1993.2  2 1,3 1,2,5   9,14,21,22 8.2% 
1993.3  2  1   13,21,22 15.9% 
1993.4  2  1   13,19,20,21 9.4% 
1994.1  2  1   13,21,22 14.1% 
1994.2  2 2 1,2   12,21 22.6% 
1994.3  1 RW Model1 
1994.4  1 2 1   18,19,20,21,25 30.5% 
1995 1 1       
1995.2  1 RW Model1 
1995.3  1 RW Model1 
1995.4  1  1  4 18,19,20,21,25 16.3% 
1996.1  1  1  4 18,19,20,21,25 16.0% 
1996.2  1  1  4 18,19,20,21,25 14.7% 
1996.3  1 2 1   18,19,20,21,25 6.0% 
1996.4  1  1   18,19,20,21,22,25 10.0% 
1997.1  1  1  4 18,19,20,21,25 11.2% 
1997.2  1  1  4 18,19,20,21,25 9.9% 
1997.3  1  1 4  18,19,20,21,25 10.5% 
1997.4  1  1  1,4 18,19,20,21,25 5.2% 
1998.1  1  1  4 18,19,20,21,25 7.1% 
1998.2  1   1  1,4 18,19,20,21,25 3.9%3 
1998.3  1 2  1 1 4 18,19,20,21,25 9.8% 
1998.4  1 2  1 1 4 18,19,20,21,25 8.2% 
1999.1  1  1  4 18,19,20,21,24,25 7.0% 
1999.2  1 2  1 1 4 14,18,19,20,21,24,25 12.3% 
1999.3  1 2  1 1 4 14,18,19,20,21,24,25 9.6% 
1999.4  1 2  1 1 4 18,19,20,21,24,24 4.1%3 
2000.1  1  1 1,3,4  23, 24, 25 0.2%2,4 
2000.2  1 2  1 1,4,5  14,18,19,20,21,24,25 4.8%4 
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Forecast 
Date Yt ∑=3 1i iS  ∑= −6 1i itY  ∑= −Δ5 0i itY  ∑= −Δ4 0 2i itY  Dummies MST 
2000.3  1   1 1 2,4 24,25,26 8.7% 
2000.4  1   1 1,3,4,5  14,18,19,20,21,24,25 5.6% 
2001.1  1  1 1 2,4 24,25,26 8.0% 
2001.2  1  1 1 2,4 24,25,26 7.5% 
2001.3  1  1 1 2,4 24,25,26 7.1% 
2001.4  1  1 1 2,4 24,25,26 5.7% 
Notation: 
The General Forecasting Equation is  
 
ti iti iti iti it
DummiesYYYSeasonalscteY ε++Δ+Δ+++= ∑∑∑∑ = −= −= −= 4 0 25 06 13 1  
 
Yt = 1 if Y = 100π and Yt = 2 if Yt = 400πt/(1+4πt) where πt= ΔlnPt and P = IPC-DI 
 
Dummies: 1965.2 = 1;  1965.4 = 2;  1974.1 = 3; 1979.3 = 4; 1981.4 = 5; 1983.1 = 6; 1983.3 = 7; 
1985.2 = 8;  1986.2 = 9;  1986.3 = 10;  1987.1 = 11; 1987.2 = 12; 1987.3 = 13; 1987.4 = 14;              
1988.1 = 15; 1988.3 = 16; 1988.4 = 17; 1989.1 = 18; 1989.3 = 19; 1990.1 = 20; 1990.2 = 21 
1991.2 = 22; 1991.3 = 23;1991.4 = 24; 1994.3 = 25; 1995.2 = 26; 
 
(1) Random Walk projections assume that inflation in the following quarters will be equal to last 
quarter inflation. 
(2) Heteroscedasticity Test 
(3) RESET Test 
(4) Normality Test. 
MST = Most Significant Test, expressed in terms of the lowest p-value among the followings tests: a) 
AR 1-3, AR 1-4 or AR 1-5 F-test (depending on the sample size); b) ARCH 1-3 or ARCH 1-4 
F-test (depending on the sample size); c) Normality test: Chi^2(2); d) hetero F-test, e) hetero-
X F-test; f) RESET test. 
OBS 1: Besides the above tests, in every regression coefficients’ stability were checked using 
recursive graphs. The following graphs were also analysed: a) 1-Step Residuals; b) Recursive 
One-Step Chow tests; and c) Recursive break point Chow tests. See comments in Section 6 
regarding the results. 
OBS 2: Grey lines indicate a new set of estimations in which the estimation sample changed, 
according to Table 2 in Section 6. 
OBS 3: Besides models in levels models using the first difference of inflation were also estimated but 
during the most turbulent periods they produced poorer forecasts so that their results are not 
reported. 
OBS 4:  All estimations were carried out using the PC-Give. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Graph 1 
Simulated Real Time Out-of-Sample Absolute Inflation Forecasts Errors 
Up to One-Year Ahead and Inflation Rates Over the Forecast Period 
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   Obs: ti PlnDLIPCi Δ= , abst+i ( )tiitti PEP lnln Δ−Δ= − , i = 1,…,4. 
 
Graph 2 
Simulated Real Time One-Quarter Ahead Out-of-Sample 
Inflation Forecasts Errors and Random-Walk Errors 
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Obs: tPlnD2LIPC
2Δ= , t+i ( )ttt PEP lnln 1 Δ−Δ= − . 
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